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The research work presented in this thesis discusses various complex issues 
associated with reactive power management and pricing in the context of new 
operating paradigms in deregulated power systems, proposing appropriate policy 
solutions. An integrated two-level framework for reactive power management is set 
forth, which is both suitable for a competitive market and ensures a secure and 
reliable operation of the associated power system. The framework is generic in 
nature and can be adopted for any electricity market structure. The proposed 
hierarchical reactive power market structure comprises two stages: procurement of 
reactive power resources on a seasonal basis, and re l-time reactive power dispatch. 
The main objective of the proposed framework is to pr vide appropriate reactive 
power support from service providers at least cost, while ensuring a secure 
operation of the power system.  
The proposed procurement procedure is based on a two-step optimization 
model. First, the marginal benefits of reactive power supply from each provider, 
with respect to system security, are obtained by solving a loadability-maximization 
problem subject to transmission security constraints imposed by voltage and 
thermal limits. Second, the selected set of generators is determined by solving an 
optimal power flow (OPF)-based auction. This auction maximizes a societal 
advantage function comprising generators' offers and their corresponding marginal 
benefits with respect to system security, and considering all transmission system 
constraints. The proposed procedure yields the selected set of generators and zonal 
price components, which would form the basis for seasonal contracts between the 
system operator and the selected reactive power service providers. 
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The main objective of the proposed reactive power dispatch model is to 
minimize the total payment burden on the Independent System Operator (ISO), 
which is associated with reactive power dispatch. Te real power generation is 
decoupled and assumed to be fixed during the reactive power dispatch procedures; 
however, the effect of reactive power on real power is considered in the model by 
calculating the required reduction in real power output of a generator due to an 
increase in its reactive power supply. In this case, real power generation is allowed 
to be rescheduled, within given limits, from the alre dy dispatched levels obtained 
from the energy market clearing process. The proposed dispatch model achieves the 
main objective of an ISO in a competitive electriciy market, which is to provide the 
required reactive power support from generators at le st cost while ensuring a 
secure operation of the power system.  
The proposed reactive power procurement and dispatch models capture both 
the technical and economic aspects of power system operation in competitive 
electricity markets; however, from an optimization point of view, these models 
represent non-convex mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) problems 
due to the presence of binary variables associated with the different regions of 
reactive power operation in a synchronous generator. Such MINLP optimization 
problems are difficult to solve, especially for an ctual power system. A novel 
Generator Reactive Power Classification (GRPC) algorithm is proposed in this 
thesis to address this issue, with the advantage of iteratively solving the 
optimization models as a series of non-linear programming (NLP) sub-problems.  
The proposed reactive power procurement and dispatch models are 
implemented and tested on the CIGRE 32-bus system, with several case studies that 
represent different practical operating scenarios. The developed models are also 
compared with other approaches for reactive power provision, and the results 
demonstrate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed model. The results 
 
 v 
clearly reveal the main features of the proposed moels for optimal provision of 
reactive power ancillary service, in order to suit the requirements of an ISO under 
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1.1 Research Motivation 
Traditionally, electric utilities have been vertically integrated monopolies that have 
built generation, transmission, and distribution facilities to serve the needs of the 
customers in their service territories. For the past decade, the electric power 
industry has been going through a process of transitio  and restructuring by moving 
away from these vertically integrated monopolies and towards competitive markets. 
This has been achieved through a clear separation between transmission and 
generation activities, as well as by creating competition in the generation sector. 
This restructuring process has created certain class of services such as frequency 
regulation, energy imbalance, voltage and reactive power control, and generation 
and transmission reserves, which are essential to the power system in addition to the 
basic energy and power delivery services. This other class of services is referred to 
as ancillary services, and they are needed to ensure system security, rel ability and 
efficiency.  
Ancillary services are no longer an integral part of the electricity supply, as 
they used to be in the vertically integrated power industry structure, since they are 
now unbundled and priced separately. The Independent System Operator (ISO) is 
the entity entrusted to provide ancillary services through commercial transactions 
with ancillary services providers. In a competitive environment, the provision of 
these services must be carefully managed so that the power system requirements 




The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) concluded in its Order 
No.888, April 1996, that reactive power supply and voltage control from generators 
is one of the six ancillary services that transmission providers must include in an 
open access transmission tariff. It also stated that re ctive power from capacitors 
and FACTS controllers, installed as a part of the transmission system, is not a 
separate ancillary service [1]. However, there are recent recommendations for 
considering reactive power provision from these sources and to recognize them as 
ancillary services that are eligible for financial compensation [2]. FERC Order 2003 
further states that a reactive power provider should not be financially compensated 
when operating within a power factor range of 0.95 lagging and 0.95 leading, but an 
ISO may change this range at its discretion [3]. 
Adequate provision of reactive power is essential in power systems in order to 
ensure their secure and reliable operation. Reactive power is tightly related to bus 
voltages throughout a power network, and hence reactiv  power services have a 
significant effect on system security. Insufficient reactive power supply can result 
in voltage collapse, which has been one of the reasons for some major blackouts 
worldwide [2]. The US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force states in its 
report that insufficient reactive power was an issue in the August 2003 blackout, 
and it recommended strengthening the reactive power and voltage control practices 
in all North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Regions [4]. 
In the erstwhile vertically integrated power system structure, provision of 
reactive power by utilities was embedded within the electricity supply to customers. 
However, in the deregulated power system structure, reactive power is managed and 
priced separately as an ancillary service. Competition in generation makes it 
important to consider the development of a reactive power market that complements 
the existing energy market. In spite of the fact that the cost of reactive power 




reliability since its sufficient provision is necessary to avoid an extremely costly 
system collapse. Moreover, under stressed system conditions, reactive power 
requirements from some generators are only met at the expense of reducing their 
real power output, and hence they significantly increase the cost associated with 
reactive power production.   
Currently, most power system operators procure reactive power services from 
available providers based on operational experience a d expected voltage problems 
in the system. In real-time, most system operators use power flow programs to 
dispatch reactive power from the already contracted generators. However, there are 
several issues and concerns associated with the curr nt procurement practices and 
pricing policies for reactive power which call for further systematic procedures to 
arrive at more efficient service management and sufficient reactive power support 
for a more reliable power system [2]. Some of these is ues are technical limitations 
associated with power system operation, whereas others are policy issues related to 
the rules under which the electricity market operates in a certain jurisdiction. 
Technical issues include the following: 
1. The high losses associated with transferring reactive power require that it 
should be provided locally. This localized nature of reactive power results in 
fewer suppliers generally available to provide the reactive power needed at 
any individual location. These suppliers are likely to have significant market 
power. 
2. The worth of 1 Mvar of reactive power support with respect to voltage 
control and system security varies across the system. The benefits of 
reactive power from generators, with respect to system security, have to be 




suppliers are determined. Currently, most system operators rely on their 
experience to determine these contracted generators.   
3. It is necessary to consider the effect of reactive power production of a 
synchronous generator on its active power generation, i.e. the effect of 
reactive power dispatch on active power dispatch, and hence on system 
security. There are certain situations where reactive power requirements 
from a generator can only be met at the cost of reducing its active power 
output. Such rescheduling in active power dispatch might result in an 
insecure operating condition. 
4. Spot energy market prices are volatile, and they affect reactive power prices. 
This will be a significant issue if reactive power is to be managed in the 
same time frame of active power, since reactive power prices will be highly 
affected by the energy market prices in this case.  
5. There are two ways reactive power ancillary services are provided: short-
term dispatch versus long-term procurement. If reactive power is provided 
based on a short-term dispatch, then several issues such as energy market 
price volatility and the effect of reactive power on active power and system 
security will arise. On the other hand, long-term procurement can solve most 
of these issues, but it does not consider real-time operating conditions. 
 
Policy issues, on the other hand, include the following: 
1. Optimal procurement of reactive power is not always chieved, i.e. ISOs do 
not purchase reactive power at least-cost. In a competitive market 
environment, reactive power services should be effici ntly provided from 




2. Reactive power ancillary services are not provided by considering all 
available sources; only reactive power from generators is considered as an 
ancillary service and is eligible for financial compensation. This decreases 
competition due to a lower number of market participants, and allows for 
market power to be exercised by certain service providers. 
3. Poor financial incentive and discriminatory payments resulting in generators 
not being equally compensated. Unless reactive power suppliers are 
encouraged to participate in fair agreements, they will not be willing to 
provide these services. This impedes adequate and sufficient provision of 
reactive power support, and it may result in limited number of service 
providers, leading to an inefficient market operation.   
4. There is a lack of transparency and consistency in pla ning and procurement 
process for reactive power services. This may result in an inefficient supply 
of reactive power support, since reactive power needs and reserves are not 
clearly defined by existing standards. 
5. Interconnecting standards are assumed to be insensitiv  to local needs, i.e. 
without considering that reactive power needs may vry from one location 
to another. 
 
For a competitive reactive power market to be develop d, the above issues have 
to be carefully examined. New policy solutions and market structures need to be 
proposed that fit into the new shift of paradigm of operation of the power system. In 
a competitive electricity market, the objective of the ISO should be to provide 
reactive power ancillary services from possible servic  providers at the least cost, 
while ensuring a secure operation of the power system. Appropriate pricing 




associated with reactive power production, are then needed by the ISO in order to 
achieve such an objective.   
1.2 Review  
1.2.1 Reactive Power Management in Different Deregulated Markets 
Reactive power management and payment mechanisms differ from one electricity 
market to another, and no uniform structure or design has yet evolved. In most 
cases, the ISO enters into contracts with the reactive power providers for 
procurement of their services. These contracts are usually bilateral agreements 
based on ISO experience, rather than on well formulated optimal procedures.  
Currently in North America, according to NERC's Operating Policy 10 [5], 
only synchronous generators are compensated for reactiv  power provision. The 
New York ISO (NYISO) uses an embedded cost based pricing to compensate 
generators for their reactive power services, and it also imposes a penalty for failing 
to provide reactive power [6]. Generators are also compensated for their lost 
opportunity costs if they are required to produce reactive power by backing down 
their real power output. Such opportunity cost payments also exist in PJM 
Interconnection [7] and California ISO (CAISO) [8]. Provision of reactive power 
services in the California system is based on long-term contracts between CAISO 
and reliable must-run generators; generators are mandated to provide reactive 
power within a power factor range 0.9 lagging to 0.95 leading. Beyond these limits, 
the generators are paid for their reactive power including a lost opportunity cost 
payment. 
The Independent Electric System Operator (IESO) in Ontario, Canada, requires 




within a +/-5% range of its rated terminal voltage. The IESO signs contracts with 
generators for reactive power support and voltage control, and generators are paid 
for the incremental cost of energy loss in the windings due to the increased reactive 
power generation. The generators are also paid if they are required to generate 
reactive power levels that affect their real power dispatch, receiving an opportunity 
cost payment at the energy market clearing price for any power not generated [9]. 
Among other international practices, in Australia, synchronous condensers also 
receive payments for providing reactive power apart from generators [10]. On the 
other hand, Sweden follows a policy wherein reactive power is supplied by 
generators on a mandatory basis and without any financial compensation. In the 
Netherlands, individual network companies have to provide for their own reactive 
power, usually through bilateral contracts with local generators, who are only paid 
for the reactive capacity but not for reactive energy [11]. 
In the United Kingdom, the Transmission System Operator (TSO)-National 
Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET) invites half-yearly tenders for both 
“obligatory reactive power services” which correspond to the base reactive power 
each generator is required to provide, and “enhanced reactive power services” for 
generators with excess reactive power capabilities. There are two payment 
mechanisms: a default payment agreement, where both the generator and NGET 
enter into an agreement for service provision and payments; and a market-based 
agreement, where generators submit their reactive power bids to the NGET [12]. 
From the brief review of utility practices above, it is clear that there is no fully 
developed structure for competition or pricing of reactive power services in any 
system. Moreover there is no unified framework, universally acceptable, for 
reactive power management practices that have developed post-deregulation. In 




based on gross system usage (embedded cost), while in other markets there is no 
mechanism for payments. Even the classification of the obligatory reactive power 
band is quite an ad hoc process that varies across ISOs without following a y well-
defined criterion, apart from the operator’s experience. Moreover, the ISOs do not 
have any well defined reactive power management system in their operational 
portfolio that could create an optimal provision ofreactive power service 
considering all the issues arising from competition. 
1.2.2 Review on Reactive Power Pricing and Management 
Traditionally, reactive power dispatch has always been viewed by researchers as a 
loss minimization problem, subject to various system constraints such as nodal 
active and reactive power balance, bus voltage limits, and power generation limits 
[13]-[16]. Another approach has been to dispatch reactive power with the objective 
of maximizing the system loadability in order to minimize the risk of voltage 
collapse [17], [18]. Furthermore, multi-objective optimization models have also 
been proposed for the reactive power dispatch problem. In these models, reactive 
power is dispatched to achieve other objectives, in addition to the traditional loss 
minimization, such as maximizing voltage stability margin [19], or minimizing the 
voltage and transformer taps deviation [20]. 
The “traditional” dispatch approaches do not consider the cost incurred by the 
system operator to provide reactive power. One of the reasons for this is that, in a 
vertically integrated system, all generators were under the direct ownership and 
control of the central operator, and hence reactive power payments were bundled in 
the energy price. However, after the liberalization of electricity markets, reactive 
power has been recognized as an ancillary service to b purchased separately by the 




Researchers have been working at grasping various issues in reactive power 
pricing and management in the context of the new operating paradigms in 
competitive electricity markets. Technical and economic issues associated with 
pricing of reactive power, along with its optimal provision, have received 
significant attention. Appropriate pricing structures should be developed in a way 
that effectively reflect the different cost components associated with reactive power 
production from synchronous generators, which are the service providers in this 
case. Accordingly, several approaches have been reported in the literature for 
identifying and analyzing these cost components [21]-[ 4], which are mainly due to 
additional losses incurred by a generator when providing the required reactive 
power support.   
Lamont and Fu have provided in [22] a comprehensive analysis of the various 
economic costs of reactive support from both generation and transmission sources. 
The reactive power cost from generation sources is divided into explicit and 
opportunity costs; explicit costs mainly comprise th capital cost for reactive power 
production, while opportunity costs account for the reduction in real power 
generation as a result of increased reactive power production. The authors have then 
proposed a cost-based reactive power dispatch that minimizes the total reactive 
power costs from generation and transmission sources, while maintaining all bus 
voltages within specified limits.  
Luiz da Silva et al have discussed in [23] the practical issues related to 
establishing a suitable cost structure for reactive power production, as well as 
developing appropriate payment mechanisms for reactive power providers. Costs of 
reactive power production are divided into fixed capit l costs and variable costs. A 
detailed analysis was carried out for different variable costs associated with reactive 
power production from various sources, including generators, synchronous 




proposed that payments for generators operating as synchronous compensators 
should be determined based on the operating time and real power consumption, 
rather than on reactive power production or absorption. Certain reactive power 
sources (e.g. capacitors and on-load tap changers), they argue, should be considered 
as part of the transmission network and not as ancill ry services providers. 
Gross et al have examined in [24] the variable costs of reactive power 
production/absorption by a generator, identifying the most dominant cost 
component. The authors have ignored the losses associ ted with reactive power 
generation within the generator capability curves, and referred instead to 
opportunity costs, which occur when the generator reaches its capability curve and 
is required to reduce its real power generation in order to meet the reactive power 
requirements, as the dominant component of the reactiv  power cost structure. The 
authors have also argued that generators should only be compensated by the ISO for 
this dominant cost component as an incentive to meet r active power support 
requirements. 
Based on these analyses, the cost of reactive power production from a 
synchronous generator can be divided into two main types: fixed cost and variable 
operating cost. Figure 1.1 shows a typical generator reactive power cost 
characteristic in which the two types of costs are shown [21]. The fixed cost 
typically denotes a part of the generator’s capital cost that goes toward providing 
reactive power; hence, it is difficult to separate this cost component from the total 
plant capital cost. The variable cost includes two main components: a first 
component arising from the increased losses in the armature and field windings of 
the generator because of an increase in its reactiv power output, and a second 
component associated with the cost of opportunity lost if the generator is required to 
reduce its real power generation in order to meet th  reactive power requirements 





Figure 1.1 Cost of reactive power production from a synchronous generator. 
 
Reactive power pricing policies have been typically based on power factor 
penalties. However, with the development of real-time or spot pricing theory [25], 
there has been significant interest in their application in the context of competitive 
electricity markets. Baughman and Siddiqi have introduced real-time pricing for 
reactive power in [26], based on the hourly marginal costs of providing real and 
reactive power at a given bus. These marginal costs, which correspond to the added 
operating expense incurred by the utility to serve an incremental demand, are 
obtained by solving an optimal power flow (OPF) that minimizes the total 
generation cost subject to operation constraints that include load flow equations, 





The physical and economic principles for reactive power pricing are discussed 
in [27], where the authors have argued that marginal costs, rather than embedded 
costs, are the appropriate basis for efficient pricing of reactive power services in a 
competitive electricity market. The authors also recommend the use of capital costs 
for reactive power pricing, since these are significant components of reactive power 
costs and are more suitable for long-term contracts. 
Hao and Papalexopoulos have presented in [28] two pricing methods based on 
reactive power unit cost measure. In the first structure, reactive power production 
limits are determined by performance requirements ad standards; for example, 
power factor can be used as one of these standards where a certain range can be 
defined by the ISO, inside which reactive power providers are not compensated for 
their services. In this structure, penalties are proposed for service providers that 
violate these performance standards, and credits are given for providing extra 
reactive power generation beyond the specified standards. The second structure is 
based on a local reactive power concept, where the ISO procures reactive power 
services from the generators based on the cost of their reactive power capacity, and 
then recovers these payments from load customers according to their demand. 
Hao has further proposed a method for reactive power management in [29], in 
which a mandated amount of reactive power is requird f om a generator beyond 
which this generator should be compensated for further reactive power production 
including the lost opportunity cost. Reactive power cost curves have been computed 
using a piece-wise linear representation of the capability curve of each generator. 
Reactive power schedules are then obtained by solving an OPF model that 





1.2.3 Review on Reactive Power Provision  
Currently, most power system operators use power flow studies to arrive at reactive 
power dispatches, primarily relying on operational experience. However, there are 
several complex issues involved in reactive power management in deregulated 
electricity markets which call for further systematic procedures to arrive at better 
solutions. In a competitive electricity market, the ISO should provide reactive 
power support from service providers at the least cost while ensuring a secure 
operation of the power system. Thus, reactive power provision from generators can 
be achieved either by short-term dispatch based on real-time operating conditions, 
or long-term procurement based on seasonal agreements b tween the ISO and the 
generators, as service providers. 
In the context of competitive electricity markets, reactive power dispatch 
essentially refers to short-term allocation of reactive power required from suppliers 
(e.g. generators) based on current system operating conditions. The ISO’s problem 
is to determine the optimal reactive power schedule for all providers based on a 
given objective that depends on system operating criteria. Different objective 
functions can be used by the ISO, beside the traditional transmission loss 
minimization, such as minimization of reactive power cost [22], [29], [30]. Any 
objective can be adopted, but since some of them might be of a conflicting nature, 
the ISO needs to choose a criterion that best suitsthe market structure. For example, 
if the ISO only seeks to minimize losses to determine the required reactive power 
support, it might end up with an expensive set of reactive power providers, 
something not desirable in a market-based environment.   
Several technical issues may arise if reactive power is to be dispatched in real-
time. These issues include market power being exercised by some reactive power 




effect of reactive power on active power generation and on system security; and the 
possibility of reactive power price volatility when it is dispatched in the same time-
frame as the spot energy market. In general, many of these issues can be resolved if 
reactive power services are optimally procured through long-term agreements 
between the ISO and the service providers [27]-[29], [31]-[33]. These long-term 
contracts would likely reduce the possibility of generators’ exercising market 
power, and at the same time could solve the problem of price volatility that arises 
when reactive power services are priced on a real-time basis. This argument is 
supported by economic theories and empirical evidence [34].  
Bhattacharya et al have proposed a two-step approach to procure reactiv  
power in [31]. In the first step, the marginal benefit of each reactive power bid with 
respect to total system losses is determined, and in the second step, an OPF-based 
model maximizing a social welfare function is solved to determine the optimal 
reactive power procurement. This work was extended in [32], where a uniform 
price auction model was proposed to competitively determine the prices for 
different components of reactive power services. Market settlement was achieved 
by simultaneously considering minimization of payment, total system losses, and 
deviations from contracted transactions. Using the same framework, a localized 
reactive power market for individual voltage control areas was proposed in [33] to 
address market power problems. 
It can be seen from the above review of reactive power ancillary service 
pricing and management that most of the reported works f cus either on developing 
suitable pricing methods that can effectively reflect the cost of reactive power 
production, or on proposing appropriate models for optimal reactive power 
procurement and/or dispatch. These models usually aim to achieve the extremum of 
a certain objective function (e.g. reactive power production cost minimization or 




not been addressed in most of the existing or proposed models is the inclusion of 
system security in the reactive power procurement/dispatch process. The ISO 
typically seeks a reactive power solution that does not violate transmission security 
constraints, which are usually represented by voltage, thermal, and stability limits 
[35]. There is a need, then, for developing appropriate mechanisms for reactive 
power ancillary service management which aim at achieving optimal and secure 
reactive power provision and ensure a reliable and efficient network operation, 
while taking into account various market related issues. 
1.3 The Present Research 
In this thesis, an integrated framework for reactive power ancillary services 
management in competitive electricity markets is presented using a two-settlement 
model approach. The proposed model works at two hierarchical levels and in 
different time horizons; the first level is the procurement model which works in a 
seasonal time horizon, while the second level is the dispatch model which works in 
a one-hour to 30-minute window. The developed framework addresses the main 
issues associated with reactive power ancillary servic  management post-
deregulation, proposing appropriate policy solutions that suit the requirements of 
the ISO in such a competitive market environment. The framework is generic in 
nature and designed to be adopted by system operators in any electricity market 
structure, be it a bilateral contract market or a pool market.  
The “big picture” of the proposed framework for optimal provision of reactive 
power ancillary service is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The reactive power procurement 
stage takes place a few months ahead of real-time, in which the ISO would call for 
reactive power offers from all available generators (service providers in this case). 




power. Based on the offers received and the forecast d real power information from 
the energy market, the ISO would solve an optimization model to maximize a 
societal advantage function (SAF) subject to system constraints, including system 
security. The solution of the optimization model yields a set of contracted 
generators, as well as the price components of reactiv  power. The contracted 
providers will have a seasonal obligation for reactive power provision and receive 
an availability payment. 
  
 




The reactive power dispatch stage, on the other hand, t kes place one hour to 
30 minutes ahead of real-time, in which the ISO would determine the available 
units for reactive power dispatch based on the set of procured/contracted generators 
and the generating units available from short-term nergy market clearing. The ISO 
then dispatches the units using an OPF-based model that minimizes total payments 
associated with reactive power dispatch, subject to appropriate system security 
constraints. Finally, the payments would be made for the service providers after 
real-time operation, based on the actual usage and dispatch requested by the ISO.  
1.3.1 Research Objectives 
In view of the above discussions, the main objectiv of this research work is to 
develop competitive mechanisms for reactive power procurement and dispatch, in 
the context of the new operating paradigms of deregulated power systems. The 
following are the main research goals: 
• Study in detail the existing utilities’ practices for reactive power 
management and pricing, aiming to develop appropriate mechanisms for 
reactive power provision that would fit the needs of ystem operators. 
• Examine the main complex issues associated with reactiv  power ancillary 
service management in the context of the new operating paradigms in 
deregulated power systems, and propose appropriate policy solutions for 
these issues. The proposed solutions should suit the requirements of an ISO 
in a competitive electricity market and, at the same time, be in line with the 
current practices and market rules. 
• Design a unified framework for reactive power management that is 
appropriate for a competitive market, and that ensures a secure and reliable 




• Develop suitable reactive power procurement procedures that take into 
consideration system security aspects, in order to de ermine an optimal set 
of generators and zonal price components, which would form the basis for 
seasonal contracts between the ISO and the selected reactive power service 
providers. 
• Redefine the reactive power dispatch problem to take into account both the 
technical and economical aspects of operation in a m rket-based 
environment, while considering the effect of the reactive power dispatch on 
real power and system security.  
• Develop computationally efficient algorithms for handling large-scale non-
linear mixed integer programming (MINLP) models that are associated with 
reactive power procurement and dispatch problems, taking into 
consideration all relevant power system constraints, and that can be 
practically implemented on real-size power systems.   
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 2 provides a detailed background review of reactive power as an 
ancillary service, within the context of power systems operation in a 
deregulated electricity market environment. Accordingly, ancillary services, 
including reactive power support, are defined stating their different types 
and how these services are managed in various electricity markets. Previous 
relevant reactive power provision models are also presented, pointing out 
their main advantages and limitations.  




management post-deregulation, proposing several policy solutions based on 
the current practices of different utilities world-wide. Subsequently, a 
unified framework for reactive power ancillary service management is 
proposed. 
• Chapter 4 presents the main procedures for long-term r active power service 
procurement. The proposed OPF-based procurement model is then tested 
with the 32-bus CIGRE benchmark system and several case studies.  
• Chapter 5 presents a redefined formulation for the reactive power dispatch 
procedures in the context of the new operating paradigms in competitive 
electricity markets. The payment minimization dispatch model is first 
proposed, and then tested with the CIGRE 32-bus system, considering 
several power system operating scenarios.  
• Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the work presented, pointing out the main 
contribution of the proposed research work, and suggesting possible 
directions for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
Reactive Power as an Ancillary Service 
2.1 Liberalization of the Power Industry  
Electric utilities have been vertically integrated monopolies that have built 
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities to serve the needs of the 
customers in their service territories. Significant capital commitments were required 
to construct large power stations and to coordinate generation, transmission and 
distribution. The price of electricity was traditionally set by a regulatory process, 
rather than by market forces, which were designed to recover the cost of producing 
and delivering electricity to customers, as well as the capital costs. Under this 
monopolistic service regime, customers had no choice f supplier; and suppliers 
were not free to pursue customers outside their desgnated service territories. 
Since the nineties, most of the electric power industry has been going through a 
process of transition and restructuring by moving away from vertically integrated 
monopolies and towards more competitive market models. This has been achieved 
through a clear separation between transmission and ge eration activities, as well as 
creating competition in the generation activities. Different countries are 
implementing industry restructuring in a variety ofways, depending on the 
characteristics of each market area which include: demand/supply balances, the 
extent of transmission capacity to facilitate energy imports to meet market demand, 
and the diversity of generation by fuel types. In designing and planning the market 
structure and rules for competition in their jurisdictions, governments, regulators 
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and other industry participants are influenced by loca  market characteristics and the 
practices in other jurisdictions. 
Although various countries are implementing industry restructuring in a variety 
of ways, there are a number of elements common to all of them. First, the 
generation of electricity and the provision of energy services to consumers are not 
natural monopolies. The generation sector is open to competition and end-users 
should have the opportunity to choose their source of supply. Generation companies 
can sell energy either through bilateral (long-term) contracts with customers, or by 
bidding for short-term energy supply in the spot markets. Second, the price of 
energy and the addition of new capacity should be driven by market forces rather 
than by some regulatory policies. Third, transmission and distribution are 
considered natural monopolies and are best managed through an independent 
regulator. Access to transmission and distribution networks is open on a non-
discriminatory basis to all electricity market participants. Fourth, an Independent 
System Operator (ISO) is created to maintain system reliability and security and to 
ensure non-discriminatory access to transmission systems. Fifth, an Independent 
Market Operator (IMO) is usually present to facilitate market-driven commercial 
power transactions. The roles of the ISO and the IMO could be carried out 
separately or by a single entity.  
Commercial power transactions in deregulated markets of en take place 
through a central power exchange, or “pool”, administered by the IMO. Offers for 
energy supply at specified prices are made or “offered” into the power pool, and 
sufficient generation capacity is dispatched to meet demand. Purchasers can “bid” 
to buy power in this “spot market” or, alternatively, they can enter into bilateral 
contracts with service providers or retailers. Energy prices, in this case, are 
negotiable, and the IMO has to make sure that the resulting transactions will not 
violate any transmission security limits. 
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Deregulation has been implemented in different ways, nd for various reasons 
among different countries [36]. In developed countries, the main reason has been to 
provide electricity to customers at lower prices, and to open the market for 
competition by allowing smaller players to have access to the electricity market by 
reducing the share of large state-owned utilities. On the other hand, high growth in 
demand and irrational tariff policies have been the driving forces for deregulation in 
developing countries. Technical and managerial ineffici ncies in these countries 
have made it difficult to sustain generation and transmission expansions, and hence 
many utilities were forced by international funding a encies to restructure their 
power industries. 
2.1.1 International Experience 
Deregulation in Europe started with unbundling of utilities when the European 
Union Directive on the Internal Electricity Market was applied on February 1999 
[37], introducing full competition among generators in the European market. The 
European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) came into xistence in July 1999 
to regulate the transmission of power between countries with effective price 
arrangements. Four transmission system operators formed the ETSO, namely 
Nordel in Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland); the 
Association of Transmission System Operators in Ireland (ATSOI); the Union for 
Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE); and the United Kingdom 
Transmission System Operators’ Association (UKTSOA). The EU Directive did not 
restrict a specific market structure for all the countries; however, it defined 
regulations that can guarantee a fair and non-discriminatory competition between 
market participants, where large and medium-sized customers are allowed to choose 
their electricity suppliers. The Directive has also required all transmission and 
distribution owners to open their lines to other parties.  
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The process of restructuring of the electricity industry in Australia was initiated 
in 1991, and by 1998 a National Electricity Market was developed, where the 
National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) acted as both the 
ISO and IMO [38]. Generators could sell energy either by bidding in the spot 
market, or through formal (bilateral) contracts.  
The New Zealand market, on the other hand, was opened i  1996. The 
Electricity Commission, which was established in September 2003, regulates the 
operation of the electricity industry and markets. New Zealand has a spot market, 
where each trading day is divided into half-hour trading periods. Energy trading is 
managed by Transpower, as the system operator, based on day-ahead bids 
submitted to the ISO by the generators and purchasers [39]. 
Since the US situation was different, with most of he electric utilities already 
owned by investors, it required a different form of restructuring. The Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978 started the whole deregulation 
process in the US by allowing non-utility generators to enter the electricity market 
[40]. The US Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) then officially required the 
electric utility industry to deregulate, and assigned the process of transition and 
restructuring to FERC. Accordingly, FECR issued Orders 888 and 889 on Open 
Transmission Access in April 1996, requiring transmission companies to open their 
transmission system to other market participants, aiming to eliminate transmission 
monopolies [1], [41]. Furthermore, FERC issued Order 2000 in December 1999, 
requiring the development of different Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) 
to handle transmission issues and ensure a reliable operation within effective tariff 
arrangements [42].   
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2.1.2 Ontario Electricity Market      
Historically, Ontario Hydro had been a vertically integrated electricity utility and 
the only supplier of electricity for most of Ontario’s customers. In November 1997, 
the Province released a White Paper entitled “Direction for Change” which set out a 
restructuring plan for the electricity industry in Ontario, aiming to create a 
competitive market. In April 1999, Ontario Hydro was restructured based on the 
Ontario Electricity Act of 1998. Finally, in May 1st, 2002, and two years after the 
initial deadline, the market was opened for competition [9]. 
Ontario Hydro was unbundled into five entities: Ontario Power Generation 
(OPG) Inc., which owns 75% of the total capacity and provides wholesale energy 
and ancillary services [43]; Hydro One Inc., which owns and controls the 
transmission, distribution and retail energy services; the Electrical Safety Authority 
(ESA), which carries out electrical equipment and wiring installation and inspection 
functions; the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation (OEFC), responsible for 
managing Ontario Hydro’s outstanding debt; and finally, the IMO, now known as 
the IESO, to act both as the ISO and IMO for Ontario’s market. The IESO is 
responsible for the dispatch of generation to meet demand, the control of the 
Ontario transmission grid and the operation of energy and ancillary services 
markets. It is also responsible for maintaining a secure and reliable operation of the 
electrical system in Ontario, ensuring that all thestandards and regulations of the 
market are being efficiently applied, and authorizing the market participants in the 
IESO administered market [9].  
Generators, both from within and outside Ontario, cmpete to sell energy 
through the IESO-administered spot market. The IESO dispatches generators based 
on their offers to sell energy and operating reserve. The Market Clearing Price 
(MCP) is determined every five minutes, in addition t  an Hourly Ontario Energy 
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Price (HOEP) which is the hourly average of the five-minute MCP [43], [44]. 
Transmission has remained a monopoly; however, it is regulated by the Ontario 
Energy Board (OEB) which decides the transmission and distribution tariffs. At the 
retail level, end-users have the option of contracting with any licensed energy 
retailer or continuing with their current distributor under a regulated supply. Market 
participants can also sell or purchase energy through physical bilateral contracts, 
provided that these contracts do not affect the real-time market administered by the 
IESO. These bilateral contracts, which represent a sm ll part in energy trading of 
Ontario, need not be reported to the IESO and are not subject to Ontario market 
rules [9].  
In 2005, another not for profit organization, The Ontario Power Authority 
(OPA), was established by The Electricity Restructuring Act [45] to ensure an 
adequate long-term supply of electricity in Ontario. The main objectives of the OPA 
are demand forecasting and management, as well as generation and transmission 
planning. In addition, the OPA is involved in various activities that ensure a reliable 
and secure operation of the Ontario power system, as well as promoting cleaner 
sources of energy and efficient use of electricity; the OPA also helps the OEB in 
developing retail price smoothing mechanisms.   
2.2 Ancillary Services 
As mentioned earlier in Section 1.1, the main feature of deregulation is the 
separation of generation and transmission activities, which has resulted in the 
emergence of ancillary services. These services include frequency regulation, 
energy imbalance, voltage and reactive power control, and generation and 
transmission reserves; these are required to ensure a reliable and secure operation of 
the power system. Ancillary services are now unbundled and priced separately, and 
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they are no longer part of the electricity supply, as it used to be in vertically 
integrated electricity markets. The ISO is responsible for providing ancillary 
services, often through commercial transactions with services providers. In a 
competitive environment, the provision of these servic s must be carefully deployed 
and managed in order to meet system and market requirements. 
2.2.1 Definitions 
FERC defines ancillary services in Order 888 as “those services that are necessary 
to support the transmission energy from resources to loads while maintaining 
reliable operation of the Transmission Provider's Transmission System in 
accordance with good utility practices” [1]. FERC Order 888 requires transmission 
providers to include six ancillary services in an open access transmission tariff to 
maintain reliability within and among the control are s affected by the transmission 
service. These six services are divided into the following two categories: 
1. Services FERC requires transmission providers to offer and customers to 
accept from the transmission provider, and these include: 
• Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch: T is service is required to 
schedule the movement of power through, out of, within, or into a 
control area in order to maintain supply-demand balance. 
• Reactive Supply and Voltage Control from Generation S urces: The 
system operator requires generators to provide (or absorb) reactive 
power in order to maintain the system bus voltages within some 
desired limits.   
2. Services FERC requires transmission providers to offer but which customers 
can accept from the transmission provider, third parties, or by self-supply, 
and these include: 
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• Regulation and Frequency Response: The use of generation 
equipped with governors and automatic generation control (AGC) to 
follow the instantaneous change in the load in order to maintain 
continuous generation-load balance within the control a ea, and a 
scheduled interconnection frequency at 60 Hz. 
• Energy Imbalance: The use of generation to correct for hourly 
mismatches between actual and scheduled delivery of energy 
between suppliers and their customers. 
• Operating Reserve - Spinning: Spinning reserve service is provided 
by unloaded generating units that can respond immediately to correct 
for generation-load imbalance in the event of a system contingency.  
• Operating Reserve – Supplemental: Supplemental reserve service is 
provided by unloaded generating units, by quick-start generation, or 
by interruptible load to correct for generation-load imbalance in the 
event of a system contingency; however the response does not have 
to be immediate, as in case of spinning reserve, but rather within a 
short period of time.  
 
NERC refers to ancillary services as Interconnected Operations Services (IOS) 
which include services that are required to support the reliable operation of 
interconnected bulk electricity systems [5]. NERC has defined, in its IOS Working 
Group Technical Report [46], twelve IOS that are necessary to support the 
transmission of power at an adequate level of reliability and security; some of these 
services are similar to the six ancillary services r quired by FERC. The twelve 
services states by the IOS Working Group are: 
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• Regulation: Using generation or load in order to maintain a minute-to-
minute generation-load balance within the control aea. 
• Load Following: The provision of the generation and interchange capability 
required to maintain the hour-to-hour and daily load v riations not covered 
by regulation service. 
• Energy Imbalance 
• Operating Reserve – Spinning 
• Operating Reserve – Supplemental 
• Backup Supply: Electric generating capacity used to replace a generation 
outage or the failure to deliver generation due to an outage of transmission 
sources, and to serve a customer’s load that exceeds its generation. 
• System Control: Activities that are required to ensure the reliabi ty of the 
North American interconnections, to minimize transmission constraints, and 
to guarantee the recovery of the system after a contingency or disturbance. 
• Reactive Power and Voltage Control from Generation S urces 
• Network Stability Services from Generation Sources: Using special 
equipment, or devices, such as power system stabilizers and dynamic 
braking resistors at the generating plants to meet NERC reliability 
requirements and maintain a secure transmission system. 
• System Black Start Capability: The availability of generating units that can 
start without an outside electrical supply to take part in the restoration plan 
after a system blackout. 
• Real Power Transmission Losses: The provision of capacity to replace 
energy losses on a transmission system. 
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• Dynamic Schedule: The provision of the real-time monitoring, telemetering, 
computer software, hardware, communications, engineeri g, and 
administration that are needed to electronically move real energy services 
associated with generation or load out of its Host Control Area and into a 
different Electronic Control Area. 
2.2.2 Management in Different Markets 
Ancillary services are defined, managed, and priced in ifferent manners across 
various deregulated electricity markets all over the world. In New York, for 
instance, the NYISO is entrusted to manage the provision of all ancillary services, 
both those provided by the NYISO and the self-supplied ones. The NYISO uses two 
types of pricing mechanisms for ancillary services procurement: embedded-cost 
based pricing method for scheduling, system control and dispatch services, voltage 
support, and black start capability services; and market-based pricing methods for 
energy balance, regulation and frequency response, and operating reserve services 
[6], where the last two services can be self-supplied by transmission customers and 
suppliers by entering through a bidding process in the ancillary services market, 
with the NYISO choosing suitable providers for each service according to the 
bidding prices. 
In the United Kingdom, The NGET is the system operator responsible for 
coordinating and managing the following two main categories of ancillary services 
defined by the Grid Code in the UK [47]: 
1. System Ancillary Services: These services are essential for adequate system 
operation, and they must be provided by all the generating units connected 
to either the NGET transmission system or a supplier’s distribution system 
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in England and Wales. System ancillary services are further divided into two 
categories:  
• Services which must be provided by all generators, including reactive 
energy from other means than synchronous condensers or static voltage 
compensators, and frequency control using frequency sensitive 
generation by including a fast acting proportional frequency control 
device (or turbine speed governor) and unit load controller, or an 
equivalent control device, to provide frequency response under normal 
operational conditions.  
• Services which generators will provide only if an agreement is reached 
with NGET, including frequency control involving the capability of a gas 
turbine or pumped storage unit to fast start, black start capability, and 
system to generator operational intertripping. 
2. Commercial Ancillary Services: These services are not necessarily provided 
by generators, but rather through ancillary services or bilateral agreements. 
These services include r active energy provided by synchronous condensers 
or static voltage compensators, and operating margin from pumped storage 
units or stand-by generation. 
 
In Australia, NEMMCO is responsible for the provision of ancillary services. 
Ancillary services defined by NEMMCO fall under one of the following three main 
categories [10]: 
1. Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS): These are services that are 
required to maintain the frequency on the electrical system at any point in 
time, within limits set by the NEM frequency standards. FCAS are divided 
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into two types, namely regulation frequency control services provided by 
generators on AGC, for the adjustment of the generation-demand balance 
after minor deviations in load or generation; and contingency frequency 
control services, for the adjustment of the generation-demand balance after a 
major contingency such as the loss of a generating unit, which include 
generator governor response, load shedding, rapid generation, and rapid unit 
unloading.  
2. Network Control Ancillary Services (NCAS): These are services that involve 
voltage control services, by means of reactive power support from 
generators or synchronous compensators and network loading control, to 
control the power flow on interconnections in the transmission network by 
means of AGC or load shedding. 
3. System Restart Ancillary Services (SRAS): These are reserves for 
contingency conditions to enable the system to resta t after a whole or 
partial system blackout. 
 
Both NCAS and SRAS are provided to the market under long term ancillary 
service contracts between NEMMCO and the service providers. These services are 
paid for through a mixture of Enabling Payments that are made only when the 
service is specifically enabled, and Availability Payments that are made for every 
trading interval in which the service is available. 
2.2.3 Ontario Electricity Market 
According to the Market Rules of the Ontario Electricity Market, the IESO procures 
ancillary services in sufficient quantities and at the appropriate locations through 
contracts with ancillary service providers that areregistered market participants to 
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ensure reliable and secure system operation [9]. The IESO recognizes three 
operating reserve classes, namely 10 Minute Synchroized Operating Reserve 
(10S); 10 Minute Non-Synchronized Operating Reserve (10N); and 30 Minute Non-
Synchronized Operating Reserve (30R) [43]. Only dispatchable generators can offer 
the 10S reserve, while dispatchable generators and loads, and boundary entities can 
offer the 10N and 30R reserves. 
In addition to the above operating reserves, which are determined within the 
energy market, the following five ancillary services are recognized in the Ontario 
Market, and hence procured by the IESO: 
1. Regulation: The use of generation equipped with governors and AGC to 
follow the minute-by-minute change in the load in order to maintain 
continuous generation-load balance within the control a ea, and a scheduled 
interconnection frequency at sixty cycles per second. 
2. Voltage Control and Reactive Support: The control and maintenance of 
system voltages at specific locations, using reactive power support provided 
by generation units, as well as by synchronous condensers, capacitors, and 
other electrostatic equipment. However, only reactive power from 
generators and synchronous condensers can be remunerated, while the rest 
of the resources are not eligible for any payments.  
3. Black Start Capability: The provision of generating resources, which can 
start without any external energy supply following a system blackout. They 
can then be used to restore the system by supplying other generating stations 
and critical loads. 
4. Emergency Demand Response Load: Includes load facilities that are willing 
to reduce their load consumption, on short notice, to enable the IESO to 
maintain the reliability of the grid. 
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5. Reliability Must-Run Resources: The IESO may need to call registered 
facilities, excluding non-dispatchable loads, to maintain the reliability of the 
grid, whenever there are insufficient resources to provide physical services 
in a reliable way. 
 
Ancillary service contracts between the IESO and ancill ry service providers 
are limited to a term of no more than 36 months, where the services providers are 
compensated for their services in a non-discriminatory manner. In doing so, the 
IESO uses one or a combination of two ways according to the Market Rules of 
Ontario; if several providers exist for a certain acillary service, the IESO 
determines the suitable providers and price for each service based on a competitive 
process. Alternatively, the IESO may have an agreement with only one ancillary 
service provider based on reasonable price offers. 
2.3 Reactive Power as an Ancillary Service 
According to FERC Order 888 [1], and NERC White Paper on Proposed Standards 
for Interconnection Services [48], only reactive power support from generation 
sources is considered as an ancillary service and is eligible for financial 
compensation. However, this may change in the near futu e to recognize other 
reactive power support sources, particularly FACTS controllers (e.g. static VAR 
compensators or SVC), as per the recent recommendatio s of FERC [2]. In view of 
the existing FERC guidelines, only reactive power support from synchronous 
generators is considered as an ancillary service throug out this thesis. Thus, it is 
useful to present a brief discussion on the main characteristics of a synchronous 
generator as a reactive power service provider and then attempt to examine its 
reactive power generation capability. 
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2.3.1 Reactive Power from Synchronous Generator 
The real power output from a synchronous generator is usually limited by the 
capability of its prime mover. When real power and terminal voltage are fixed, the 
armature and field winding heating limits determine th  reactive power capability of 
a generator [49]. Thus, in Figure 2.1, the armature heating limit is a circle with a 
radius (VtIa), centered at the origin, and expressed by the following equation: 
 
222 )( atGG IVQP ≤+                                                                               (2.1) 
 
The field limit, on the other hand, is a circle with radius (VtEf/Xs) at (0, -Vt
2/Xs) and 

























QP                                                                (2.2) 
 
Where, 
PG:  Active power generation of the synchronous generator. 
QG:  Reactive power generation of the synchronous generator. 
Vt:  Terminal voltage of the synchronous generator at which its capability 
curves are calculated. 
Ia: Rated armature current of the synchronous generator  which its 
capability curves are calculated. 
Ef: Excitation voltage of the synchronous generator.  
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Xs: Synchronous reactance of the synchronous generator. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Synchronous generator capability curve. 
 
The generator’s MVA rating is the point of intersection of the two curves, 
given by (2.1) and (2.2), and therefore its corresponding real power rating is given 
by PGR. At an operating point A, with real power output PGA such that PGA<PGR, the 
limit on QG is imposed by the generator’s field winding heating limit, whereas, 
when PGA>PGR, the limit on QG is imposed by the generator’s armature winding 
heating limit. 
There is a mandatory amount of reactive power that each generator has to 
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provide, which is shown by the shaded area in Figure 2.1. If the generator is called 
upon by the ISO for additional reactive power provision beyond this area, it is then 
eligible for payment to compensate for the increased costs associated with losses in 
the windings. Such mandatory and ancillary classifications of reactive power 
capability is in line with what most system operatos currently have in place for 
reactive power management. 
According to the capability curve in Figure 2.1, the generator can provide 
reactive power until it reaches its heating limits (point A in Figure 2.1); any further 
increase in reactive power provision from the generator will be at the expense of a 
reduction in its real power generation. Hence, the generator is expected to receive 
an opportunity cost payment for providing reactive power beyond QGA, which 
accounts for the lost opportunity to sell its real power in the energy market and the 
associated revenue loss. Thus, the following three regions for reactive power 
generation can be identified in Figure 2.1 [31]: 
• Region I (QGmin ≤ QG = QG1 ≤ 0) refers to the under-excitation region, in 
which the generator is required to absorb reactive power.   
• Region II (0 ≤ QG = QG2 ≤ QGA) refers to the over-excitation region, in 
which the generator is required to supply reactive power within its reactive 
power capability limits.   
• Region III (QGA ≤ QG = QG3 ≤ QGB) refers to the lost opportunity region, in 
which the generator is asked to reduce its active power production in order 
to meet the system reactive power requirements. It i  assumed here that PGB 
would be the minimum amount of real power that the g nerator is 
able/willing to produce. 
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2.3.2 Reactive Power Service Provision 
Traditionally, reactive power support and voltage control have been viewed by 
researchers as a loss minimization problem, in which reactive power is provided 
from different sources, including capacitor banks, FACTS controllers, and 
synchronous generators, subject to various system constraints such as nodal active 
and reactive power balance, bus voltage limits, and power generation limits. Thus, 
reactive power is dispatched by solving the following loss minimization problem: 
 




22 cos25.0. δδ                                          (2.3) 
( )∑ −+=−
j
ijijijjiDiGi YVVPPts δδθcos..                                                    (2.4) 
( )∑ −+−=+−
j
ijijijjiCiDiGi YVVQQQ δδθsin                                            (2.5) 
maxmin
GiGiGi PPP ≤≤                                                                                  (2.6) 
         maxmin GiGiGi QQQ ≤≤                                                                                 (2.7) 
      maxmin CiCiCi QQQ ≤≤                                                                                  (2.8) 
         maxmin iii VVV ≤≤                                                                                    (2.9) 
      ( ) max, ijij PVP ≤δ                        (2.10) 
 
Where, 
Vi:  Voltage magnitude at bus i, in p.u. 
δi:  Voltage angle at bus i, in radians. 
Gij: Conductance of the line connecting buses i and j, in p.u. 
Yij: Magnitude of the ij  entry of the admittance (Y) matrix, in p.u. 
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θij: Angle of the ij  entry of the admittance (Y) matrix, in radians. 
PDi:  Active power demand at bus i, in p.u. 
QDi:  Reactive power demand at bus i, in p.u. 
PGi
min:    Minimum active power limit of a generator at bus i, in p.u. 
PGi
max:    Maximum active power limit of a generator at bus i, in p.u. 
QGi
min:    Minimum reactive power limit of a generator at bus i, in p.u. 
QGi
max:   Maximum reactive power limit of a generator at bus i, in p.u. 
QCi:  Reactive power output from a capacitor at bus i, in p.u. 
QCi
min:   Minimum reactive power limit of a capacitor at bus i, in p.u. 
QCi
max:   Maximum reactive power limit of a capacitor at bus i, in p.u. 
Vi
min:      Minimum allowable voltage at bus i, in p.u. 
Vi
max:    Maximum allowable voltage at bus i, in p.u. 
Pij: Power flow from bus i to bus j, in p.u. 
Pij
max: Maximum allowable power flow from bus i to bus j, in p.u. 
 
 The above OPF-based model is basically a non-linear optimization problem, 
with a loss minimization objective function (2.3). Equations (2.4) and (2.5) 
represent the nodal active and reactive power balance equations. Active power 
generation is kept within upper and lower limits using (2.6); whereas, constraints 
(2.7) and (2.8) limit the reactive power from generato s and capacitors, respectively. 
Bus voltage limits are maintained using (2.9). Finally, line flow limits are imposed 
by (2.10).  
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In the context of vertically integrated utilities, the cost of reactive power 
support was bundled within the single electricity tariff, and service providers were 
not paid separately for this service. Accordingly, the “traditional” dispatch 
approaches did not consider the cost incurred by the system operator to provide the 
required reactive power support.  
In competitive electricity markets, reactive power support from generators is 
provided as an ancillary service either through long-term procurement based on 
seasonal contracts between the ISO and the service providers, or through short-term 
dispatch based on real-time system operating conditi s. Currently, most system 
operators procure reactive power by signing long-term agreements with the service 
providers; such agreements are mainly based on the operator’s experience and the 
expected system conditions rather than on optimization models. Subsequently, in 
real-time, the ISO typically uses power flow analysis to arrive at a feasible reactive 
power dispatch from the procured generators. Such dispatch mechanisms only 
ensure a secure reactive power dispatch, however, they do not take into 
consideration the payments associated with such a dispatch, i.e. the ISO does not 
dispatch reactive power at least cost.  
Bhattacharya et al have looked at the problem of optimal procurement of 
reactive power ancillary services, in various papers [31]-[33]. A two-step reactive 
power procurement model was proposed in [31], which considered total system 
losses as a decision criterion in the procurement process. First, the marginal benefits 
of reactive power supply from each provider with resp ct to system losses, 
represented by Lagrange multipliers associated withthe reactive power balance 
constraints, were obtained by solving the OPF model (2.3)-(2.9); line flow limits 
(2.10) were not considered in this model. Second, these Lagrange multipliers, 
together with the reactive power price offers from the generators, were used to 
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solve the following procurement model that maximizes a societal advantage 
function (SAF), and hence determine the required reactive power support:    
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Where,  
m2g:  Cost of loss price offer for generator g for operating in the over-
excitation region, in $/Mvarh. 
m3g:  Opportunity price offer for generator g for operating in the 
opportunity region, in $/Mvar2h.  
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λg:  Lagrange multiplier associated with the nodal rective power balance 
equation denoting the sensitivity of the system loss to a change in 
reactive power injection at generator bus g, in MW/Mvar. 
γg:  Lagrange multiplier associated with the reactive power limit 
indicating by how much the system loss will change for a unit 
change in reactive power capability for generator g, in MW/Mvar. 
CL:  A cost parameter denoting the economical worth of reducing losses 
in $/MWh. 
QG1g:   Under-excitation reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QG2g:   Over-excitation reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QG3g:    Reactive power of generator g operating in the opportunity region, in 
p.u. 
QGbg
lead:  Base leading reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGbg
lag:   Base lagging reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGAg:   Maximum reactive power limit of generator g without reduction in 
real power generation, in p.u. 
QGBg:    Maximum allowable reactive power limit of generator g with 
reduction in real power generation, in p.u. 
W1g, W2g, W3g: Binary variables associated with the three regions f reactive 
power operation for generator g. 
 
The above procurement model (2.11)-(2.17) is a mixed- nteger non-linear 
programming (MINLP) problem, where the real power output from generators (PG) 
is assumed to be known a priori because of the nature of the market structure 
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considered therein. The limits for the three regions f reactive power operation for 
each generator are given in (2.15). Constraints (2.16) and (2.17) guarantee that only 
one out of the three regions, discussed earlier and illustrated in Figure 2.1, is 
selected. Accordingly, W1, W2 and W3 in (2.15) and (2.16) are binary variables 
associated with these three regions, for each generator.  
It can be seen that the reactive power procurement procedures proposed in [31] 
do not properly account for system security in either of the two steps, since the 
model (2.11)-(2.17) does not include line flow limits, which are of great importance 
to represent system security. In addition, the model neglects the effect of reactive 
power on the pre-determined active power, as generators operating in the 
opportunity region are required to reduce their active power generation; it is then 
important to check whether or not the model yields a reasonable solution. 
Moreover, from the optimization point of view, the procurement model (2.11)-
(2.17) represents a difficult optimization problem, since it is a non-convex MINLP 
problem; the solution of this type of problem is very challenging due to the 
presence of both the integer variables and the non-convexities of the model itself.  
It has been widely recognized by system operators that system security and 
particularly the impact of inadequate reactive power support on security is an 
important issue to be considered in system operation. In this context, security 
aspects need to be incorporated in the reactive power provision procedures. The 
impact of reactive power from each generator on system security has to be 
examined and represented in the procurement model. In real-time, transmission 
security limits have to be properly included in thereactive power dispatch model. 
Moreover, the effect of reactive power dispatch on real power dispatch has to be 
considered in real-time, to ensure a secure operating point after the rescheduling of 
real power from the already dispatched values obtained from the market clearing 
process, due to high reactive power requirements.  
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2.4 Reactive Power and System Security 
Reactive power is directly associated with voltage, and hence voltage control is 
achieved in electric power systems by absorbing/delivering reactive power. Voltage 
control implies maintaining the voltage at each busin the system within defined 
limits in order to prevent damage to electric power equipment and prevent voltage 
collapse in the case of large disturbances such as system faults, loss of generation, 
or transmission line outage. Voltage collapse occurs when the system tries to serve 
more load than what it can support. 
If the power system is subjected to a large disturbance, the voltage will drop, 
resulting in an increase in the current to maintain he power supplied to the loads, 
and hence causing the lines to consume more reactiv power, leading to a further 
drop in the voltage. Moreover, if the current increas s beyond the current carrying 
capabilities of the transmission lines, these lines will trip, overloading other lines 
and eventually causing cascading failure. Also, if voltage drops too low, some 
generators will automatically disconnect to protect themselves. If the power system 
is unable to provide the necessary reactive power requi ed to supply the reactive 
power demand, voltage drop may result in a complete voltage collapse. Sufficient 
reactive power is then an essential requirement for a secure and reliable operation of 
the electric power system, since inadequate reactive power supply might result in 
voltage stability problems. 
In order to ensure a secure operation of the power system, the ISO needs to 
check the technical feasibility of potential transactions after energy market 
settlement; only those transactions that are within e transfer capabilities of the 
network are allowed. This is particularly important when dealing with reactive 
power, since it has a direct bearing on system security, and hence the power transfer 
capabilities of the transmission system [50]. 
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Typically, the transfer capabilities of the system in the main transmission 
corridors are defined using the concept of Available Transfer Capability (ATC), 
which is in turn defined as the remaining transfer capability of the transmission 
system for further commercial activity over and above its already committed uses 
[51], and is commonly expressed as: 
 
CBMETCTRMTTCATC −−−=                                  (2.17) 
 
Where, TTC is the Total Transfer Capability; TRM is the Transmission Reliability 
Margin, which is typically assumed to be a fixed value (e.g. 5% of TTC under 
normal operating conditions in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council WECC 
[52]); ETC is the Existing Transmission Commitments; and CBM is the Capacity 
Benefit Margin and is usually included in the ETC.  














P are the maximum powers the system can securely 
transmit considering thermal limits, voltage limits, and stability limits, respectively, 
based on at least an N-1 (worst single) contingency criterion. 
Currently, electricity markets are usually operated under stressed loading 
conditions due to the increased demand and power transfers, thereby increasing the 
probability of the system experiencing stability problems. Under such conditions, 
system stability limits can be approximated through voltage stability limits [53]. In 
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this context, the TTC can be evaluated using the system Loading Factor (LF), which 
is defined as the amount of additional loading of agiven transmission corridor for a 
given dispatch pattern that does not violate thermal li its, bus voltages limits or 
voltage stability limits [54], and can be expressed as: 
 
0LFLFLF c −=                                                           (2.19) 
 
Where, LF0 is the existing loading (the ETC), while LFc is the system loading at the 
maximum loading point. Hence, using a TRM = 0.05*TTC, the ATC can be 
approximately expressed in terms of LF as follows: 
  
 095.0 LFLFATC c −≈                                                  (2.20) 
 
It is worth mentioning here that the concept of a “system-wide” ATC, as 
proposed in [53], has been adopted in this thesis. This approach, however, does not 
preclude using (2.20) to determine the ATC values of particular transfer corridors, 
since this can be readily accomplished by properly defining power “sources” and 
“sinks” in the computation of LFc.  
Typically, an N-1 contingency criterion is used in the TTC calculation, which 
consists of studying single contingency cases one by one. For each contingency, 
LFc is calculated, and the minimum LFc defines the “worst” contingency.  
The LFc can be readily obtained from the system PV curves, as this represents 
the change in load between the operating point and the nose of the curve, which 
corresponds to how much the system may be loaded before reaching its thermal, 
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voltage magnitude, or voltage stability limits. A typical PV curve is illustrated in 
Figure 2.2, showing the relation between the aforementioned ATC definitions and 
its relation with the system LF. This PV curve can be obtained using Continuation 
Power Flow (CPF) methods [54], which allow calculating complete voltage 
profiles, and hence determining the value of LFc for a given “direction” of 
generation and loading increase considering different contingencies. On the other 
hand, the LFc can also be computed by reformulating the conventional OPF with the 
objective function of maximizing LF [55], [56]. OPF-based models not only yield 
the value of LFc, but also provide Lagrange multipliers that can be used as 
sensitivities equivalent to those computed by solving a CPF [57]. 
 
Figure 2.2 A Typical PV curve. 
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Based on the above discussions, and the idea of calculating marginal benefits 
of reactive power from each generator presented in [31], system security can be 
incorporated in the reactive power procurement process by calculating the marginal 
benefits of reactive power from generators with respect to system security. These 
marginal benefits can be represented by the Lagrange multipliers associated with an 
OPF-based model that maximizes LF, subject to transmission security constraints. 
Incorporating system security in the reactive power procurement process is one of 
the main novel contributions of this thesis; more details on how this is achieved will 
be presented in Chapter 4, where the proposed reactiv  power procurement model is 
discussed. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the process of “liberalization” of the power 
industry, with a detailed discussion on ancillary services including definitions, 
types, and the way they are managed in different jurisdictions worldwide. A 
background discussion on reactive power from synchronous generators is then 
presented, explaining the different regions of reactive power production and the 
associated cost components. Finally, the effect of reactive power on active power 
and system security is discussed, pointing out the importance of incorporating 
system security within the procedures of reactive power provision. 
________________________________________________ 
1The work presented in this chapter has been published in the proceedings of the 2006 




A Unified Framework for Reactive Power Ancillary 
Service Management1 
3.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 2, the main aspects of reactive power ancill ry services are presented, 
pointing out the clear shift in the way these services are managed and priced post-
deregulation. Reactive power management and payment chanisms differ from 
one electricity market to another, and no uniform structure or design has yet 
evolved. It is clear from the brief review for utilities’ practices given earlier in 
Section 1.2.1 that there has been a move towards creating competitive reactive 
power markets in different countries and regions. However, there are several issues 
concerning the existing provision policies and payment mechanisms for reactive 
power services that impede the full development of a competitive market. Thus, this 
chapter first discusses the main issues associated wi h reactive power management 
and pricing in the context of the new operating paradigms in deregulated power 
systems. Subsequently, appropriate policy solutions, which are in line with the 
existing market rules and regulations, are proposed. Finally, a unified framework 
for reactive power management that is appropriate for a competitive market and that 
ensures a secure and reliable operation of the associ ted power system, is proposed 
and developed. 
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3.2 Issues Associated with Reactive Power Management 
3.2.1 Optimal Provision for Reactive Power Services 
In a competitive electricity market, reactive power provision by the ISO should be 
achieved in an optimal manner. The question that arises here is this: What is the 
best optimization criterion to be adopted by the ISO?  In other words, what is the 
optimization objective that the ISO should be seeking to determine the system 
reactive power schedules? Should it be system loss minimization, as has been the 
usual practice, or should it be maximization of system security or minimization of 
reactive power costs?  
Any of the aforementioned objectives can be adopted; however, since some of 
these objectives are of a conflicting nature, the ISO needs to choose a criterion that 
best suits a competitive market structure. For example, if the ISO seeks to minimize 
losses to determine its reactive power provision, it could end up with an expensive 
set of providers located close to the reactive loadcenters, without guaranteeing that 
the optimal solution would improve system security. Similarly, if the ISO seeks 
only to minimize its reactive power costs, it might end up with a set of low-priced 
offers from far-off generators, thus increasing thesystem losses and certainly 
negatively affecting system security. Hence, the choice of an appropriate 
optimization criterion is essential for the development of competitive reactive 
power provision mechanisms. 
3.2.2 Reactive Power Payment Mechanisms  
In a competitive market environment, if reactive power service providers are not 
properly compensated for their service, they will not have enough incentive to 
provide the required reactive power support, which will definitely affect the power 
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system operation and security. An important issue that arises with regard to reactive 
power markets is then the choice of an appropriate p yment mechanism. Should it 
be a market-based auction mechanism where the suppliers rovide their reactive 
power bids to the ISO, which in turn determines the best reactive power price using 
an appropriate objective function? If so, should it then be a uniform price market for 
reactive power with a single reactive power price for the whole system, or a zonal 
level reactive power auction market where the system is divided into zones, and 
separate reactive power prices are determined for each zone? Should a Locational 
Marginal Price (LMP) market, in which reactive power price varies across each bus, 
be used? 
If there is no auction market, then reactive power payments could be set on a 
contractual basis, with the ISO entering into bilater l agreements with the service 
providers and signing long-term contracts for the required reactive power services. 
For example, the IESO in Ontario signs 36-month contracts with generators, 
recognizing additional energy losses and opportunity costs associated with reactive 
power generation, and the cost of running the generati g units as synchronous 
condensers if requested by the IESO [9]. The ISO-New England, on the other hand, 
pays a capacity component for qualified generators f  the capability to provide 
reactive power services, in addition to the energy and lost opportunity components 
[59]. 
The reactive power payment mechanism could also take the form of a tender 
market structure as in the UK [12], where the select d generators are contracted for 
six months and are paid based on their initial tender price offers, similar to a pay-as-
bid (first price) auction market. 
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3.2.3 The Effect of Reactive Power on Active Power and System 
Security 
It is well accepted that the principal function of a synchronous generator is to 
generate real power to meet the demand of the system. Under certain circumstances, 
usually arising from critical system conditions, the ISO may request or instruct a 
generator to increase its reactive power output, which may require a reduction in its 
active power output, thereby affecting market and system operating conditions. The 
reactive power capacity of a synchronous generator is determined by its capability 
curve, shown in Figure 2.1, which demonstrates the relationship between its real 
and reactive power generation. Three regions of reactive power operation were 
identified earlier in Section 2.3.1: under-excitation, over-excitation, and opportunity 
regions. If the generator is operating in any of the first two regions, no change in its 
real power generation is required. Conversely, any reactive power generation 
requested by the ISO in the opportunity region will require a decrease in the real 
power generation from the already dispatched levels. Therefore, such an effect on 
real power dispatch has to be considered when modeling the reactive power 
dispatch problem.  
The rescheduling in real power generation associated with an increase in the 
reactive power requirements may result in an insecure operation of the power 
system. Hence, the ISO needs to check the technical feasibility of the resulting 
solution after reactive power dispatch procedures are completed. Only those 
transactions that are within the transfer capabilities of the network are allowed. 
Therefore, in order to ensure a reliable and secure operation of the power system, it 
is important to incorporate system security in the reactive power provision 
procedures by including appropriate transmission security constraints, and to 
consider the effect of reactive power dispatch on real power dispatch and hence 
system security. Transmission security constraints are typically represented by 
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voltage limits, thermal limits, and stability limits.  
3.2.4 Energy Price Volatility 
It has been the general experience of market operators nd ISOs that energy prices 
can be highly volatile under certain system conditions, such as demand spikes or 
outages. In a short-term operational time-frame, volatile energy market conditions 
would certainly have an impact on reactive power procu ement and dispatch 
procedures. 
3.2.5 Reactive Power Market Power 
One of the primary barriers to the implementation of a competitive market for 
reactive power is the possibility of market power arising because of the limited 
number of reactive power service providers at a given location in such a market. 
Furthermore, reactive power is a “local” service, i. . it must be procured and 
provided as close to the demand buses as possible because of the technical issues 
associated with transporting reactive power over long distances. Hence, in a 
reactive power market, it is certainly plausible that some “well-located” suppliers 
may try to exercise market power by submitting excessively high price offers or by 
withholding reactive power supply in an attempt to increase the reactive power 
market price to their own advantage. 
FERC Order 2000 mentions that market monitoring is an essential tool for 
ensuring non-discriminatory market operation and avoiding any opportunity for 
exercise of market power [42]. Several indices for measuring/quantifying market 
power (or market concentration) in real power auctions have been proposed in the 
literature, such as the traditional Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) [60], or the 
Residual Supply Index (RSI) [61]. In the context of reactive power markets, it 
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would be important to consider these or other indices to analyze and thus address 
market power issues. 
3.2.6 Reactive Power Management Time Line 
In the context of deregulation, reactive power provisi n can possibly be managed as 
a short-term provision in which it is dispatched from available generators based on 
real-time system operating conditions. It may be also managed as a seasonal 
provision in which it is procured based on long-term agreements between the ISO 
and the service providers. If reactive power is managed concurrently with the 
energy market clearing process, some problems may arise such as price volatility 
and the effect of reactive power on real power and system security.  
 Currently, most system operators sign long-term contracts with reactive power 
service providers, based on operational experience a d knowledge of the system 
and the expected voltage problems. In real-time, most system operators run power 
flow programs to determine the required reactive power dispatch levels from 
contracted providers. The ISO has to check if the solution of the power flow is not 
violating any of the security limits. In the case when generators are operating in the 
opportunity region, where they are required to back-up their real power generation 
to meet the reactive power requirements, the ISO needs to check if the resulting 
operating point after rescheduling of real power is secure or not.       
3.3 Proposed Policy Solutions 
3.3.1 Decoupling of Active and Reactive Power 
Based on the above discussions regarding market ineffic encies and the associated 
problems that arise when both active and reactive power are simultaneously 
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managed and priced by the ISO, a possible solution is to decouple these two 
markets from each other. Decoupling of active and reactive power markets is 
possible by placing them in two entirely different operating time frames. This 
minimizes the possibility of adverse effects on reactive power prices that might 
arise from the price volatility of real power. 
The decoupling of active and reactive power has also been suggested in [30] 
and [62]. Such a decoupling implies that the OPF problem can be separated into 
sub-problems of active and reactive power. The active power sub-problem 
essentially provides the active power dispatch and prices in real-time based on a 
cost minimization (or social welfare maximization) market settlement model. The 
reactive power sub-problem, operating on different time frames, provides reactive 
power contracts, prices, and dispatch levels based on appropriate optimization 
criteria.  
It is important to mention that the solution obtained from a “coupled” OPF 
model, simultaneously dispatching active and reactive power, is theoretically closer 
to the optimal. However, in addition to the price volatility issue that arises when 
handling active and reactive power simultaneously, the computational burden is 
also an important issue for large-size power system, since it would require solving 
a rather complex and large-scale MINLP model. Decoupling the OPF problem 
provides the required flexibility for market development in reactive power services 
and avoids having to deal with the coupled model complexity, while retaining an 
acceptable level of accuracy. 
3.3.2 Zonal Reactive Power Management 
Different pricing mechanisms for reactive power ancillary services were mentioned 
in Section 3.2.2, raising the question of which oneis more suitable in the context of 
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deregulation. Given the localized nature of reactive power and the common 
practices amongst most electric utilities in regards to splitting the whole system into 
zones or voltage control areas, zonal reactive power management and pricing might 
be an appropriate approach. In the case of a system-wide uniform price, market 
inefficiencies resulting from market power being exercised by some reactive power 
service providers, anywhere in the system, will affect all other providers in the 
system. Zonal reactive power pricing, on the other hand, helps isolate and confine 
any existing market inefficiencies within the zone. These market inefficiencies may 
arise from some service providers trying to exercis market power by increasing 
their reactive power price offers. Examining and pricing reactive power support in a 
zonal context rather than as a whole system could also reduce the computational 
burden on the ISO [33].  
In terms of service provision, zonal reactive power management allows for 
having additional reactive power reserves for each zone; this reserve can be called 
upon by the ISO in emergency cases associated with severe contingencies in the 
system. In general, zonal reactive power management can be achieved by splitting 
the system into different voltage control areas [63]. 
3.3.3 Alternative Sources of Reactive Power Supply 
One of the main challenges associated with reactive power provision is that, so far, 
only reactive power support from synchronous generators has been considered as an 
ancillary service and eligible for financial compensation in North America, as per 
FERC Order 888 [1], and NERC White Paper on Proposed Standards for 
Interconnection Services [48]. However, these restrictive policies are currently 
under review, since it can be readily argued that with a more liberal reactive power 
ancillary service provision structure, there would be more competition due to an 
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increased number of providers. This will lead to a reduction in reactive power 
prices, and improved system reliability and security. 
Motivated by these discussions at various forums, FERC has recommended in 
its latest report on reactive power and voltage control in competitive electricity 
markets that system operators should fully consider other sources of reactive power 
supply [2]. In view of these discussions, it is important to examine how other 
reactive power providers, such as capacitor banks ad FACTS controllers, could 
participate in the reactive power ancillary service markets to help develop a fully 
competitive reactive power market. This particular issue is not studied in this thesis, 
since the characteristics of these reactive power resources make them essentially 
different from generators; hence, appropriate policies will be required to determine 
how these resources can be properly compensated for providing reactive power as 
an ancillary service. Therefore, in the work presented in this thesis, only reactive 
power from synchronous generators is considered as an ancillary service, as per the 
existing FERC and NERC regulations. 
3.3.4 Accounting for System Security 
Given the impact of reactive power on active power and system security, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.3, system security should then be incorporated in the 
reactive power provision procedures. Accounting forsystem security can be 
achieved in two ways. The first way is by including appropriate transmission 
security limits, represented by voltage limits, thermal limits, and line flow limits, in 
the reactive power procurement and dispatch models. The second way is by having 
system security as a main criterion in the reactive power procurement procedures, 
where a set of contracted generators is selected and reactive power prices are 
determined.  
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 Under stressed operating conditions, some generators might be required to 
increase their reactive power generation level beyond their capability limits 
determined by the field or armature heating limits, and hence the generator will be 
operating in the opportunity region (between QGA and QGB in Figure 2.1). 
Accordingly, this generator will have to reduce itsactive power generation, 
resulting in a rescheduling of active power from the already dispatched levels 
obtained from the energy market clearing process. Hence, the ISO has to check 
whether this new operating point is secure or not, i.e. whether or not any of the 
transmission security limits are violated. Thus, it is important not only to 
appropriately include security limits in the reactive power procurement and dispatch 
models, but also to take into consideration the effct of reactive power on active 
power. 
3.4 A Proposed Framework for Reactive Power Management 
Based on the discussions on the issues associated with reactive power management 
in Section 3.2, and the proposed policy solutions i Section 3.3, an integrated 
framework for reactive power management is proposed h re. The proposed 
framework comprises two hierarchical levels of reactive power management, 
namely reactive power procurement and reactive power dispatch. Reactive power 
procurement is essentially a long-term issue, i.e. a seasonal problem, wherein the 
ISO seeks optimal reactive power contracts with possible suppliers that would be 
best suited to its needs and constraints in a given season. This optimal set of 
contracts should be determined taking into account forecasts of the demand and 
system conditions expected over the planning horizon. The criteria for such 
procurement could be many, but they should essentially take into consideration the 
cost/price offers of reactive power provision, and system security. 
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Reactive power dispatch, on the other hand, corresponds to the short-term, 
“real-time” allocation of reactive power to suppliers based on current operating 
conditions. The ISO determines the optimal reactive power schedule for all 
providers based on a certain objective that depends o  ystem operating criteria, 
such as minimization of total system losses, minimization of deviations from 
contracted transactions, or maximization of system loadability to minimize the risk 
of voltage collapse. 
Figure 3.1 explains the two hierarchical levels of the proposed reactive power 
management scheme on a time-scale. The procurement level is assumed to take 
place 180 days ahead of real-time, where the set of contracted generators and 
reactive power prices are determined, and an availability component is paid to the 
contracted service providers. Based on hourly energy market clearing, the reactive 
power dispatch procedure is assumed to take place one h ur to 30 minutes ahead of 
real-time. Finally, reactive power settlements take place post-dispatch, and 
payments are made to the service providers based on real-time support levels.  
The following sub-sections provide an overview of the proposed two levels of 
reactive power management.  
3.4.1 Long-Term Management 
This is the higher of the two levels in the hierarchy of the proposed reactive power 
management scheme. The objective of the ISO in this case is to procure “adequate” 
long-term reactive power supply for the system. Theproposed procurement process 
would work as follows: The ISO first calls for reactive power offers from available 
service providers (only synchronous generators, according to FERC regulations), 
and based on the received offers, it solves an optimization model that maximizes a 
societal advantage function subject to system constrai ts, properly representing 
system security. Appropriate security indices, represented by marginal benefits of 
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reactive power from each generator with respect to system security, are 
incorporated in the procurement procedures. The solution of procurement model 
yields the required set of generators to be contracted for reactive power service 
provision, as well as reactive power price components. The selected providers will 
have a long-term obligation for reactive power provision and will receive an 
availability payment for such a commitment. The schematic representation of the 
long-term reactive power procurement procedure is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.1 Active and reactive market clearing and dispatch at day D and hour k. 




Figure 3.2 Long-term management (procurement) of reactive power services. 
 
It is proposed that the reactive power price offers to be submitted by generators 
comprise three parts, as per the discussion on reactiv  power cost components 
(Figure 1.1) and the classification of reactive power output based on the generator’s 
capability curve (Figure 2.1). Thus, the following represent the different 
components of a reactive power price offer from a generator: 
• Availability price offer (mo, $/h): A fixed component to account for that 
portion of a supplier’s capital cost that can be attributed to reactive power 
production.  
• Cost of loss offer (m1 and m2 $/Mvarh): A linearly varying component to 
account for the increased winding losses as reactive power output increases 
in the over- and under-excitation regions, respectiv ly. 
• Opportunity offer (m3, $/Mvar2h): A nonlinearly varying component to 
account for the lost opportunity cost when a generator is constrained from 
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producing its scheduled real power in order to increase its reactive power 
production. 
3.4.2 Short-Term Management 
The lower level in the proposed hierarchical approach to reactive power 
management is the short-term management function, namely reactive power 
dispatch. In practice, active power and reactive power have been handled separately 
by most power system operators. Typically, active power dispatch is carried out 
using a linear programming model associated with an Economical Load Dispatch 
(ELD) calculation that maximizes social welfare, while guaranteeing that system 
security constraints are met [64]. Reactive power, on the other hand, is dispatched 
based on power flow studies and operational experience. However, as discussed 
earlier in Section 3.2, there are several complex issues involved in reactive power 
service provision in deregulated electricity markets that require further study and 
appropriate procedures to arrive at better solutions. Ideally, reactive power should 
be dispatched from generators in an economical manner that minimizes the ISO’s 
payment burden, while also considering system security constraints. 
 Figure 3.3 illustrates the proposed schematic procedure for short-term dispatch 
of reactive power. The scheme is based on the assumption that a pre-determined set 
of contracted (or procured) generators with corresponding reactive power price 
components is available. This set of contracted generators should ideally be 
obtained within a long-term framework, for example, from the procurement process 
discussed earlier, to avoid the adverse impact of energy price volatility on reactive 
power prices. In line with current reactive power dispatch approaches, the ISO 
would carry out the dispatch procedure one hour to 30 minutes ahead of real-time. 
Based on the set of procured/contracted generators and the generating units 
available from the short-term energy market clearing, the ISO would determine the 
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available units for reactive power dispatch. It would then dispatch the units using 
the proposed OPF-based model that minimizes total payments associated with 
reactive power dispatch, subject to appropriate system security constraints. Finally, 
payments would be calculated after real-time operation, based on the actual usage 
and the dispatch requested by the ISO. 
 























Figure 3.3 Short-term management (dispatch) of reactive power services.  
 
Most system operators use dc-OPF models for real power market clearing and 
dispatch, with iterative mechanisms to guarantee system security. In this thesis, 
because of its emphasis on reactive power dispatch, i  is assumed that the 
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information from the energy market clearing process, i.e. energy prices and 
associated real power dispatches, are available prior to the execution of the reactive 
power dispatch procedures. It should be noted that an ac-OPF can also be used in 
lieu of the dc-OPF to arrive at the real power market clearing and dispatch. 
However, the computational burden of such an OPF is large for actual power 
systems, since it requires solving a rather complex and large-scale NLP model 
every few minutes (e.g. every 5 minutes in Ontario).  
An important input to the proposed reactive power dispatch model is the set of 
available generators for real-time reactive power dispatch. Letting Χ be the set of 
contracted/procured generators for reactive power obtained at the procurement 
stage, and Y be the set of available generators from energy market clearing, then the 
available set of generators for reactive power dispatch will be given by ξ = Χ ∩ Υ. 
  The reactive power capacity of the available generating units is predetermined, 
based on the capability curves of these generators (Figure 2.1). Accordingly, for 
each generator, the upper and lower limits of the thr e reactive power operating 
regions are assumed to be known. 
3.4.3 Reactive Power Pricing 
Based on the three regions of reactive power operation and the associated costs 
identified earlier in Section 2.3, a reactive power payment function (QPF) is 
formulated, as shown in Figure 3.4, comprising the following payment components: 
an availability payment component (with a price ρ0), which is a fixed component to 
account for the portion of a supplier’s capital cost that can be attributed to reactive 
power production; two loss payment components (with prices ρ1 and ρ2), which are 
assumed as linearly varying components to account for the increased winding losses 
as reactive power output increases, in the under- and over-excitation regions, 
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respectively; and an opportunity payment component (with a price ρ3) to account 
for the lost opportunity cost associated with the operation in Region III. This 
opportunity component appears as a quadratic term bcause of the assumption that 
active power costs are parabolic functions of output ower, which may be 
considered to approximately change linearly with reactive power in Region III 
(from point A to B in Figure 2.1). Accordingly, QPF for each generator g in the 
system can be mathematically represented by the following equation: 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Reactive power payment function. 
 
Chapter-3 A Unified Framework for Reactive Power Management 
 
65 






























































































     (3.1) 
 
Where, 
QG1g:    Under-excitation reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QG2g:    Over-excitation reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QG3g:  Reactive power of generator g operating in the opportunity region, 
in p.u. 
QGmg:    Mandatory reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
Sb:  Base MVA power (assumed here to be 100 MVA). 
ρ0g: Availability price component of reactive power for generator g, in 
$/h.  
ρ1g: Under-excitation price component of reactive power for generator 
g, in $/Mvarh.  
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ρ2g: Over-excitation price component of reactive power for generator g, 
in $/Mvarh.  
ρ3g: Lost opportunity price component of reactive power for generator 
g, in $/Mvar2h. 
QGbg
lead:  Base leading reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGbg
lag:   Base lagging reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGg
min:   Minimum reactive power limit of generator g, in p.u. 
QGAg:   Maximum reactive power limit of generator g without reduction in 
real power generation, in p.u. 
QGBg:    Maximum allowable reactive power limit of generator g with 
reduction in real power generation, in p.u. 
PGRg:   Rated active power of generation g, in p.u. 
PGog:   Market clearing pre-determined active power dispatch for generator 
g, in p.u. 
Wmg:  Binary variable associated with mandatory reactive power 
production for generator g. 
W1g, W2g:  Binary variables associated with Regions I and II of reactive power 
operation for generator g, respectively. 
W3rg, W3fg: Binary variables associated with armature and field limits of 
reactive power generation for generator g, espectively. 
 
In this equation, the binary variables are needed to reflect the fact that the generator 
operates in only one of the three reactive power opating regions defined in Figure 
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2.1. Observe that QPF does not include the mandatory component of reactive 
power generation (QGmg), since generators are not financially compensated for such 
obligatory amount of reactive power.  
The four reactive power price components should be determined from the 
procurement stage, where the ISO signs long-term contracts with reactive power 
service providers in which both parties agree on the prices and the payment 
mechanism. For example, in Ontario, the IESO signs 36-month contracts with 
generators that are willing to provide reactive power services. Prices are based on 
costs of providing reactive power, which include additional costs from energy 
losses incurred by operating at a non-unity power factor and the cost of running the 
generating units as synchronous condensers if requested by the IESO [9]. 
Generators that are asked to reduce their real power utput in order to meet the 
reactive power requirements are paid an additional lost opportunity component at 
the market clearing price. The New England ISO, on the other hand, pays a capacity 
component for qualified generators for the capability to provide reactive power 
services, in addition to the energy and lost opportunity components [59]; a “base 
VAR rate” of 2.32 $/Kvar-yr has been newly incorporated for qualified generators 
available for reactive power provision below 0.95 leading or 0.95 lagging power 
factors. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter discusses the different issues associated with the existing provision 
policies and payment mechanisms for reactive power ancillary services. These 
issues include: determining the best optimization objective to be adopted by an ISO 
while providing reactive power services; determining the best payment mechanism 
for reactive power services; the effect of reactive power from a synchronous 
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generator on its real power output and system security; energy price volatility and 
its effect on reactive power prices; and the possibility of market power because of 
the small number of reactive power service providers in a certain location. 
Accordingly, appropriate policy solutions are proposed to address some of these 
issues. Among the proposed solutions are: decoupling of active and reactive 
provisions in order to reduce the effect of energy price volatility on reactive power 
prices; procurement of reactive power support on a zonal basis in order to reduce 
the payment burden on the ISO and help reduce and co fine the effects of market 
power; proper incorporation of system security in the reactive power procurement 
procedures; and considering other sources for reactiv  power support such as 
capacitor banks and FACTS devices.     
Based on the current practices for reactive power provision by various ISOs in 
competitive electricity markets, this chapter proposes a hierarchical reactive power 
market structure that addresses the various issues associated with the existing 
policies and practices for reactive power management and payment mechanisms. 
The proposed framework is based on the separation of reactive power management 
into two distinct time-frames, i.e. a reactive power procurement stage carried out on 
a seasonal basis, and a reactive power dispatch stage th t determines the reactive 
power levels in “real-time”.  
The proposed framework assumes a general offer structure for reactive power 
services based on the generators’ reactive power costs and capability curves. It is 
argued that a zonal pricing procedure would be the most appropriate mechanism for 
payment of reactive power services, so that the local nature of reactive power 
supply can be used to address market power issues associ ted with players 
indulging in gaming strategies. The need to include reactive power providers other 
than generators to improve market competition and thus reduce reactive power 
prices is also discussed. Finally, arguments are presented for the need to properly 
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represent system security in the proposed reactive power procurement and dispatch 
OPF-based procedures, proposing a specific methodology for including system 
security in the procurement stage. 
 
________________________________________________ 





A Procurement Scheme for Reactive Power Ancillary 
Services Considering System Security1 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, a two-level framework for the operation of a competitive market for 
reactive power ancillary services is presented. It is argued that the first-level, i.e. 
reactive power procurement, should take place on a seasonal basis, while the 
second-level, i.e. reactive power dispatch, should take place close t real-time 
operation. To this effect, a reactive power procurement scheme is proposed in this 
chapter. 
A two-step reactive power procurement scheme is preent d and discussed in 
this chapter. The proposed novel scheme incorporates, for the first time, system 
security as a selection criterion for the desired st of contracted generators. Given 
the competitive nature of electricity markets, the procurement model takes into 
consideration offers of reactive power from generators. The proposed procedure 
yields the selected set of generators and reactive power price components which 
would form the basis for seasonal contracts between th  ISO and the selected 
reactive power service providers. 
4.2 The Proposed Reactive Power Procurement Scheme 
The objective of the ISO is essentially to define and procure adequate long-term 
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reactive power supplies for the system. The proposed procurement scheme would 
work as follows (see Figure 3.2): 
• The ISO calls for reactive power offers from the reactive power providers. 
The structure of these offers should ideally reflect their cost of providing 
reactive power. This issue was discussed in detail in Section 3.4.1. 
• Based on the received offers, the ISO carries out an auction settlement, i.e. 
solves an optimization model to maximize a societal advantage function 
(SAF) subject to system constraints that include system s curity. 
• This procurement market settlement, i.e. the solution of the optimization 
model, yields a set of contracted generators, as well as the price components 
of reactive power. The contracted providers will have  seasonal obligation 
for reactive power provision, and may receive an avail bility payment. 
4.2.1 Reactive Power Offers from Generators 
Based on the offer structure defined in Section 3.4.1, the long-term nature of the 
proposed procurement market model, and the local chra teristics of reactive 
power, reactive power prices can be determined for each of the components of the 
reactive power offers. In case of traditional offer-based commodity markets, the two 
pricing approaches usually adopted are: pay as bid (first price auction), where 
selected participants are paid as per their respective bid; or uniform price market 
(second price auction), where all selected participants are paid a uniform price, 
which is the highest accepted offer. It has been argued by economists that uniform 
price markets provide an incentive to participants to bid their true costs and hence 
such auctions promote competition.  
Applying the uniform price to reactive power markets would be a natural 
extension to the already existing real power auction mechanisms. However, given 
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the localized nature of reactive power control, and the issues of market power 
associated with the limited number of providers at a given location, it would be 
more pertinent to disaggregate the uniform price of reactive power into zonal 
components. This has been argued in [33], where the power system is split into 
different voltage control areas or zones based on electrical distances or sensitivity 
analyses. Such a zonal uniform price mechanism for reactive power markets would 
reduce the impact of market power exercised by certain gaming generators, and 
should hence restrict them only to their given zones. 
4.2.2 Marginal Benefits of Reactive Power Supply with Respect to 
System Security  
The idea of examining the marginal benefits of reactive power injection at a bus has 
been proposed in [31], where the Lagrange multipliers associated with a loss-
minimization OPF model were used to represent these marginal benefits. However, 
it has been widely recognized by ISOs that system scurity, and particularly the 
impact of inadequate reactive power support on security, are important issues to be 
considered in system operation. In this context, a re ctive power procurement 
model based on the marginal contributions of reactive power injection to system 
security is proposed in this chapter.  
As explained earlier in Section 2.4, system security can be incorporated in the 
reactive power procurement procedures by calculating he marginal benefits of 
reactive power from generators with respect to system security. These marginal 
benefits are represented by Lagrange multipliers associated with a loadability (or 
LF) maximization problem, subject to system security constraints. Thus, system 
security can be introduced in the reactive power procurement market model by 
solving the following OPF model based on [66]: 
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Where, g denotes a generator bus. The following are the model variables to be 
determined by the solution of the LF maximization problem: 
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  LF:  Loading factor. 
   KG:  Variable to model a distributed slack bus. 
QGi:   Reactive power generation at bus i, in p.u. 
Vi:   Voltage magnitude at bus i, in p.u. 
δi:   Voltage angle at bus i, in radians. 
Pij:  Power flow from bus i to bus j, in p.u. 
vga, vgb :  Two auxiliary variables representing the changes in generator g bus 
voltage due to reactive power limits. 
 
 The following are the model parameters which are input into the optimization 
model: 
PGi:   Active power generation at bus i, in p.u. 
PDi:  Active power demand at bus i, in p.u. 
Yij:   Magnitude of the ij  entry of the admittance (Y) matrix, in p.u. 
θij:   Angle of the ij  entry of the admittance (Y) matrix, in radians. 
QDi:  Reactive power demand at bus i, in p.u. 
Vtg:   Terminal voltage of generator g at which its capability curves are 
calculated, in p.u. (assumed here to be 1.05 p.u.) 
Iag:  Rated armature current of generator g at which its capability curves 
are calculated, in p.u. 
Efg:  Excitation voltage of generator g, in p.u.  
Xsg:  Synchronous reactance of generator g, in p.u. 
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PGRg:   Rated active power of generation g, in p.u. 
QGg
min:   Minimum reactive power limit of generator g, in p.u. 
Vi
max:  Maximum allowable voltage at bus i, in p.u. 
Vi
min:  Minimum allowable voltage at bus i, in p.u. 
Pij
max: Maximum allowable power flow from bus i to bus j, in p.u. 
PGi
max:   Maximum active power generation at bus i, in p.u. 
Vg0:   Generator g terminal voltage corresponding to operating point 1 in 
Figure 2.2, in p.u. 
 
In the above OPF model, (4.2) and (4.3) are the nodal active and reactive 
power flow equations, where the variable KG is used to model a distributed slack 
bus to be able to better represent the distribution of system losses. The field and 
armature winding heating limits are imposed by (4.4). Equation (4.6) constrains all 
bus voltage to be within appropriate limits, while (4.7) imposes transmission line 
thermal limits, with Pij representing the power flowing from bus i to bus j. Finally, 
(4.8) guarantees that generator active power dispatch levels will not be exceeded. 
In order to account for the effect of reactive power limits on generator voltage 
settings and properly model the generators’ voltage regulators, constraints (4.9)-
(4.12) are added to the model. These constraints ensur  that all the generators will 
be operating at their terminal voltage settings, defined by operating point 1 in 
Figure 2.2, as long as the reactive power is within its limits; in this case, the two 
variables vga and vgb will be equal to zero to satisfy (4.9) and (4.10). If the reactive 
power output of any of the generators hits its maxium limit, set by (4.4), 
constraints (4.10) and (4.12) will force vgb to have a positive value, therefore 
reducing the voltage at this generator bus according to (4.11). Similarly, if the lower 
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limit of reactive power output for any generator is eached, vga will have a positive 
value, hence increasing the voltage at this generator bus. Note that vga and vgb may 
still have a zero value even if reactive power limits are reached; these variables are 
used to simulate the loss of voltage control due to limits.  
The Lagrange multipliers that represent the marginal benefit/contribution of 
each reactive power source with respect to system security for the above model are 
λg, γg and µg. The Lagrange multiplier λg is the dual of the nodal reactive power 
balance constraint (4.3), denoting the sensitivity of the system security (LF) to a 
change in reactive power demand at a generator bus g; γg is the dual of reactive 
power constraint (4.4) of generator g, indicating by how much LF will change for a 
unit change in reactive power capability of this generator; and µg is the dual of the 
under-excitation constraint (4.5). Accordingly, allof the three Lagrange multipliers 
will have a zero value for any generator as long as its QG lies within the limits given 
by (4.4) and (4.5); whereas, either γg or µg will have a non-zero value for any 
generator if its QG reaches the upper or lower limits, respectively, and the 
corresponding λg in this case will be equal in magnitude, but with the opposite sign. 
If QG for any generator is within its limits, it will be capable of compensating for 
any increase in reactive power demand at this generator bus without affecting LF, 
and hence λg will be zero in this case. Notice that the sign of these multipliers 
depends on the nature of the optimization problem and the way the associated 
constraints are treated in the solution process. 
The optimization model (4.1)-(4.12) is solved consider ng single line outage 
contingency cases, wherein relevant system elements are tripped one at a time to 
determine the Lagrange multipliers associated with the worst contingency, as per 
the N-1 contingency criterion. The worst contingency is the one that yields the 
minimum value of LF amongst all contingencies. It is important to highlight the fact 
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that other contingencies might exist, other than the worst one, where some 
generators’ reactive power outputs may have a more significant effect on system 
loadability, i.e. higher values of  λg, γg and µg; however, according to NERC’s 
security criterion, operators are not required to act unless the worst contingency 
conditions are violated. Hence, a contingency that does not violate security limits, 
regardless of the positive effect that QG of a particular generator may have on 
improving system security for that given operating condition, is not relevant for the 
purpose of improving system security from the N-1 contingency criterion point of 
view. It should also be highlighted, as explained further below, that this proposed 
procurement model is solved for multiple operating conditions that are 
representative of the given season of interest, and hence a variety of worst 
contingencies and associated sensitivities are taken into account in the proposed 
procurement process. 
4.2.3 Maximization of Societal Advantage Function 
Once the reactive power limits and the marginal benefits (represented by λ, γ and µ) 
of each provider with respect to system security are determined, and reactive power 
offers are received, the ISO is in a position to carry out a procurement market 
settlement where its sole objective is to maximize a Societal Advantage Function or 
SAF. The classical concept of social welfare from economic theory is extended here 
to formulate a novel reactive power SAF which is based on the determination of 
aggregate system benefits accrued from reactive power services minus the expected 
payment by the ISO. The proposed SAF is formulated on a zonal basis and can be 
expressed as follows: 
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Where, 
QG1g:    Under-excitation reactive power of a generator g, in p.u. 
QG2g:    Over-excitation reactive power of a generator g, in p.u. 
QG3g:  Reactive power of a generator g operating in the opportunity 
region, in p.u.  
Sb:  Base MVA power (assumed here to be 100 MVA). 
ρ0z: Availability price component for reactive power in zone z, in $/h.  
ρ1z: Under-excitation price component for reactive power in zone z, in 
$/Mvarh.  
ρ2z: Over-excitation price component for reactive power in zone z, in 
$/Mvarh.  
ρ3z: Lost opportunity price component for reactive power in zone z, in 
$/Mvar2h. 
CL:  A cost parameter denoting the economical worth of increasing the 
system loadability, in $/MWh. 
λg:  Lagrange multiplier associated with the nodal reactive power 
balance equation (4.3) at bus g, in MW/Mvar. 
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γg:  Lagrange multiplier associated with the reactive power capability 
(4.4) of generator g, in MW/Mvar. 
µg:  Lagrange multiplier associated with the lower reactive power limit 
(4.5) of generator g, in MW/Mvar. 
QGbg
lead:  Base leading reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGbg
lag:   Base lagging reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGAg:   Maximum reactive power limit of generator g without reduction 
in real power generation, in p.u. 
W1g, W2g:  Binary variables associated with Regions I and II of reactive 
power operation for generator g, respectively. 
W3rg, W3fg: Binary variables associated with armature and field limits of 
reactive power generation for generator g, espectively. 
 
In (4.13), the subscript g denotes a generator in the system, while Z refers to 
the set of generators in zone z, considering that the system is divided into voltage 
control zones. The three reactive power generation components QG1, QG2, and QG3 
for a generator g correspond to the three regions of operations defined earlier in 
Section 2.3.1 and shown in Figure 2.1. Observe that, in (4.13), only reactive power 
generation beyond the mandatory region, i.e. between QGb
lead and QGb
lag, is 
considered for financial compensation for the generators, as per the payment 
structure shown in Figure 3.4.  
The constant CL in (4.13) is a “loadability” cost parameter (in $/MWh) 
denoting the economic worth of increasing the system loadability which represents, 
in this model, the expected worth of active power for the season of interest, and 
hence can be defined by the ISO using historical data and appropriate forecasting 
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methods. In this thesis, CL is assumed to be equal to 100 $/MWh, which is a typical 
“high” price figure in the Ontario electricity market. 
Observe that SAF (4.13) is based on the notion of a “marginal security benefit”, 
i.e. the economic worth of reactive power support with respect to system security. 
For example, λg denotes the change in LF per Mvar change in reactive power 
demand at a bus g in zone z; since LF is dimensionless, λg is scaled by the total 
system MW demand, resulting in MW/Mvar units. Hence, th  term CL|λg| represents 
the hourly marginal benefit to the ISO in $/Mvarh, with respect to system security, 
from a change in reactive power demand at generation bus g in zone z. Similarly, 
the marginal benefit with respect to system security from a generator operating at its 
armature or field current limit or at the limit of its under-excitation mode are given 
by CL|γg| and CL|µg| respectively. On the other hand, the four price components ρo, 
ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3 represent the cost burden (total expected payment or TEP) of the ISO 
to provide reactive power support. Therefore, the proposed procurement algorithm 




zSAFSAFmax.                 (4.14) 
 ( ) iYVVPP
j
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maxmin               (4.17) 
  ( ) ijPVP ijij ∀≤ max,δ               (4.18) 





































         (4.19) 
  gWWWWW rgfggmgg ∀=++++ 13321                 (4.20) 
  gQQQQQ GmggGgGgGGg ∀+++= 321           (4.21) 
  zZgmW zgg ∀∈∀≤ ;111 ρ             (4.22) 
  zZgmW zgg ∀∈∀≤ ;222 ρ          (4.23) 
  ( ) zZgmWW zgrgfg ∀∈∀≤+ ;3333 ρ          (4.24) 
  ( ) zZgmWWWW ozogrgfggg ∀∈∀≤+++ ;3321 ρ          (4.25) 
 
Where,  
QGBg:  Maximum allowable reactive power limit of generator g with reduction 
in real power generation, in p.u. 
QGmg:  Mandatory reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
Wmg:  Binary variable associated with mandatory reactive power production 
for generator g. 
mog:  Availability price offer for generator g for operating in the over-
excitation region, in $/h. 
m1g:  Cost of loss price offer for generator g for operating in the under-
excitation region, in $/Mvarh. 
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m2g:  Cost of loss price offer for generator g for operating in the over-
excitation region, in $/Mvarh. 
m3g:  Opportunity price offer for generator g for operating in the opportunity 
region, in $/Mvar2h. 
 
In this model, the three regions of reactive power production (including 
mandatory reactive power) identified from the generator’s capability characteristic, 
shown in Figure 2.1, are introduced in (4.19)-(4.21), which guarantee that only one 
of these three regions will be selected at a time, for each generator. Therefore, the 
above model (4.14)-(4.25) is a non-convex MINLP problem because of the 
presence of binary variables associated with the reactive power regions of 
operation; this type of optimization problem requires special solvers and/or solution 
techniques. The approach used in this thesis for solving this optimization problem is 
discussed in detail in the following sub-section. 
 The constraints (4.22)-(4.25) ensure that the highest offered price for each of 
the four components of reactive power determines th four reactive power price 
components in each zone. According to (4.22)-(4.24), only the offers from 
contracted generators for each region of reactive power operation are considered 
when determining the corresponding price component. O  the other hand, (4.25) 
ensures that the zonal availability price component (ρoz) will have a non-zero value 
if there is any contracted generator in that zone.  
The solution of the above procurement model (4.14)-(4.25) yields the set of 
contracted generators as well as the four zonal uniform price components. This 
procurement procedure needs to be carried out for di ferent cases (e.g. light load, 
heavy load, contingencies, etc.), in order to propely r present the various expected 
system operating conditions for the season of interes .  
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After the zonal uniform price components are determined for a variety of 
system operating conditions, the ISO signs contracts with the selected generators in 
which they receive an availability payment component. The generator will also 
receive a “usage” component, applicable in the real-time dispatch stage based on 
the actual reactive power supplied. 
4.2.4 Generator Reactive Power Classification Algorithm 
The proposed procurement model (4.14)-(4.25) captures both the technical, i.e. 
transmission security constraints, and economical, i.e. marginal benefits and 
payments, aspects of reactive power procurement. However, from the optimization 
point of view, this model represents a difficult optimization problem. The proposed 
model (4.14)-(4.25) would ideally require the presence of binary variables to select 
only one out of the three reactive power operating regions, and the corresponding 
price components, as per (4.22)-(4.25). One approach to solve the proposed model 
(4.14)-(4.25), then, is to formulate the problem as an explicit non-convex MINLP 
problem. However, the solution for this type of problem is very challenging because 
of the presence of both the binary variables and the non-convexities of the model 
itself [67], [68]. Solution techniques for this type of problem may get trapped at 
suboptimal solutions or even fail to yield a feasible point [69]. The number of 
available solvers for MINLP problems is still rather small, and according to [68], 
most of these solvers require a substantial amount f computational time for a small 
case study and might not yield an optimal solution f r a large case study within 
many CPU hours. Moreover, most of the available MINLP solvers (such as 
DICOPT) have not been able to handle transmission capacity constraints, which are 
of great importance to represent system security. Hence, solving (4.14)-(4.25) using 
non-convex MINLP techniques is not the most appropriate choice, especially when 
realistic sized power systems are considered. 
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An iterative Generator Reactive Power Classification (GRPC) algorithm is 
proposed in this thesis to solve the proposed procurement model (4.14)-(4.25). The 
idea of the proposed GRPC is to re-formulate the problem so that it becomes a 
series of “standard” NLP sub-problems. The main objective is to choose only one 
region of reactive power operation to satisfy the conditions associated with the 
objective function SAF in (4.13) and the constraints (4.22)-(4.25). The proposed 
GRPC algorithm is depicted in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.  
The algorithm begins with initial allocations of reactive power to generators 
(QGg) obtained from an initial feasibility analysis of the system (e.g. power flow 
solutions from given dispatch schemes). The initial region of reactive power 
operation of each generator can be identified according to the values of γg and the 
initial values of QGg, as depicted in Figure 4.1. If QGg is less than zero, the generator 
is operating in Region I; hence, QG2 and QG3 for this generator will be zero, and QG1 
will be a variable within its lower and upper limits. On the other hand, if QGg is 
greater than zero and the value of γg is equal to zero, this implies that the generator 
is operating in Region II; hence, QG1 and QG3 for this generator will be zero, and 
QG2 will be a variable within its lower and upper limits. Finally, Region III is 
selected if a generator has a value of γg not equal to zero.  
Once the new set of QGg is obtained, an update of the solution is required for 
each generator if QGg hits the limits in any region, as shown in Figure 4.2. For 
example, if the reactive power of a generator g in Region II hits its lower limit, the 
problem is re-solved with this generator operating in Region I, and the new optimal 
value of SAF is calculated. If this value is higher than the old ne, this generator is 
now in Region I; otherwise, the generator remains in Region II. Similarly, if a 
generator hits the upper limit of Region II, then the problem is re-solved with this 
generator operating in Region III. Note that the updating process is applied to only 
one generator at a time. The updating process is repeat d for a certain number of 
Chapter-4 A Procurement Scheme for Reactive Power Services 
 
85 
iterations as shown in Figure 4.2. Observe that the updating process stops if no 
change in SAF is achieved after a complete iteration. 
The proposed GRPC algorithm avoids the need for binary variables, thus 
keeping the optimization problem as an NLP; hence it can easily be applied to 
realistic power systems while incorporating all transmission system security 
constraints. The only issue is its dependence on the choice of the initial set of QG 
values and the order of the generators. This is also n issue with other non-convex 
MINLP   solution   approaches   which   are   not  c ncerned  with  finding  a  global 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Identifying the region of QGg. 




Figure 4.2 Updating the solution to (4.14)–(4.25). 
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optimum but with obtaining a practical feasible solution that meets typical ISO 
requirements. With regard to the choice of initial conditions, in this work, the ISO's 
“best practice” approach has been used as the initial solution point, wherein the 
initial values of QG are readily obtained from a power flow solution associated with 
the values of PG obtained from the active power dispatch process. This initial 
solution point significantly improves the convergenc  and speed of the algorithm. 
With regard to the order of generators, it is expected that the updating process 
will be affected by this order, and hence a random order of generators was adopted 
in this thesis.  Almost the same set of contracted g nerators and zonal reactive 
power prices were obtained in each case, but a different number of iterations were 
required for convergence. However, this cannot be generalized, as the order in 
which the generators are updated might affect the final solution for other test 
systems. This is to be expected, as the optimization pr blem is non-convex, and 
thus only local optimal solutions can be guaranteed [70]. Note that the issue of 
obtaining local optima when solving non-convex NLP optimization problems 
applies to most practical optimization models in power systems (e.g. the ac-OPF 
problem); the same argument applies to the optimization model (4.1)-(4.12). 
Finally, it is important to highlight the fact that the proposed reactive power 
procurement model is to be carried out off-line and much ahead of real-time 
operation, and hence the computational burden is not a major issue in this case, 
regardless of the system size. 
4.3 Implementation and Test Results 
In this section the complete reactive power procurement model described in Section 
4.2 is implemented and the details of the solution procedure are also discussed. The 
simulations are carried out using the CIGRE 32-bus test system (Figure 4.3) [71], 
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since this allows for direct comparisons with the results available in the literature. 
The test system has 20 generators and a total demand of 10,940 MW. The system is 
split into three zones or voltage control areas as reported in [33]. Without any loss 
of generality, the power flow limits are considered to be dependent on the 
transmission voltage levels; thus, limits of 2000 MW for the 400 kV lines, 350 MW 
for 220 kV lines, and 250 MW for 130 kV lines are assumed. Generators are 
assumed to be eligible for financial compensation in all of the three regions of 
operations defined in Section 2.3.1, i.e. QGb
lead and QGb
lag in Figure 2.1 are assumed 
to be equal to zero for all generators without any loss of generality; this is in line 
with the IESO’s approach for compensating reactive power service providers. The 
proposed optimization models, which are essentially NLP problems, are modeled in 
GAMS and solved using the MINOS solver [72].  
4.3.1 Determining the Marginal Benefits of Reactive Power Services  
As explained in Section 4.2.2, the marginal benefits of reactive power from each 
generator with respect to system security are repres nt d by the three Lagrange 
multipliers λ, γ, and µ obtained by solving the LF-maximization model (4.1)-(4.12). 
A feasible solution, representing operating point 1 on the PV-curve, shown in 
Figure 2.2, is an input to the model; this initial point can be determined by the ISO 
based on classical economic dispatch procedures using seasonal demand forecast. 
The solution of the LF-maximization model yields the operating condition at the 
nose of the PV-curve, i.e. the point of voltage collapse. The model is first solved at 
normal operating conditions without considering any contingencies. Table 4.1 
shows the initial operating point and the final soluti n, as well as the associated 
values of the three Lagrange multipliers λ, γ, and µ. The value of the loading factor 
(LF) in this case is 0.12 p.u., indicating a possible ncrease of 12% in the system 
loadability.  




Figure 4.3 CIGRE 32-bus system split into three zones. 
 
In Table 4.1, the values of λ, γ, and µ are zero for any generator when its QG
lays within the limits (4.4) and (4.5). On the other and, γ has a non-zero value for 
seven generators whose reactive power reach its upper limit; none of these 
generators are located in Zone a.  
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Table 4.1 Solution of the LF-maximization model (4.1)-(4.12) without contingency. 
Input: operating point 
1 in Figure 2.2 
Solution: voltage collapse point in Figure 2.2 
Lagrange multipliers 
Zone Bus 
PG (MW) V (p.u.) QG (MW) V (p.u.) 
λ γ µ 
4072 1391.6 1.025 453 1.025 0 0 0 
4071 470 1.03 68.9 1.03 0 0 0 
4011 461 1.05 29.6 1.05 0 0 0 
4012 626.4 1.044 -103.5 1.044 0 0 0 
1013 492 0.931 -33.9 0.931 0 0 0 
1012 752 0.926 73.8 0.926 0 0 0 
a 
1014 400 0.957 112.8 0.957 0 0 0 
4021 282 1.1 102.4 1.094 -0.853 0.853 0 
4031 329 0.996 119.4 0.984 -0.737 0.737 0 
4042 658 0.983 238.8 0.959 -1.076 1.076 0 
4041 282 0.956 102.4 0.956 -0.431 0.431 0 
2032 799 0.912 100.4 0.912 0 0 0 
1022 235 0.952 85.3 0.926 -0.729 0. 729 0 
b 
1021 478.8 1.017 144.7 1.017 0 0 0 
4062 564 0.954 131.6 0.954 0 0 0 
4063 1128 0.943 202.6 0.943 0 0 0 
4051 658 0.922 238.8 0.872 -1.811 1.811 0 
4047 800 0.947 287.4 0.947 0 0 0 
1043 188 0.937 68.2 0.816 -2.503 2.503 0 
c 
1042 376 0.9 33.2 0.9 0 0 0 
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 Observe that γ for all of the seven generators has a positive sign, indicating an 
increase in LF for any increase in the reactive power capability of the generator. 
The corresponding value of λ in this case will be equal in magnitude but with the 
opposite sign, indicating a decrease in LF with any increase in reactive power 
demand at this generator bus. Since none of the genrators is operating at its lower 
limit of reactive power, the value of µ is zero for all of the 20 generators. It can also 
be seen that there is no longer any control over bus voltages when a generator 
reaches its reactive power limits, i.e. these voltages are lower than their 
corresponding initial values. 
 The LF-maximization model (4.1)-(4.12) is solved for different contingencies 
following the N-1 contingency criterion, with one transmission line being taken out 
at a time and the model is solved to find the corresponding LF value. The values of 
LF for the five most critical contingencies are illustrated in Figure 4.4. The minimal 
value of LF results when the transmission line connecting Buses 4031 and 4032 is 
taken out. Hence, this contingency is referred to as the “worst contingency”, and the 
associated Lagrange multipliers in this case represnt the marginal benefits of 
reactive power from each generator with respect to the system security at the worst 
contingency.  
 The solution of the LF-maximization model (4.1)-(4.12) without the 
transmission line connecting Buses 4031 and 4032, i.e. at the worst contingency, is 
given in Table 4.2. The initial operating point is the same as that for the no-
contingency case; however, the solution and hence the associated Lagrange 
multipliers are different in this case, since the power flow in the system changes as 
a result of the contingency. Generators at Buses 4021, 4031, 4041, 1022, and 1043 
are still operating at the upper limits of their reactive power but with a different 
impact on system security, represented by the values of γ and λ at the corresponding 
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bus, compared to that associated with normal operating condition without 
contingencies (Table 4.1). Two generators, 4042 and 4047, are now required to 
produce zero reactive power, which is their lower limit; hence, µ has a non-zero 
value at these two buses, denoting the sensitivity of LF to the change in the lower 














4021.4032 4031.4032 4041.4044 4042.4044 4045.4062
Out-of-Service Line
 
Figure 4.4 LF values for the most critical contingencies. 
 
A comparison between the magnitudes of λ associated with the LF-
maximization model without contingencies and at the worst contingency is 
illustrated in Figure 4.5. It can be seen from the c art that the magnitude of λ has 
increased at Generator buses 4031 and 4041as a result of the voltage drop at these 
buses following the contingency. This is because the impact of reactive power from 
these  generators  on system  loadability  is now  higher with this drop in the voltage  
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Table 4.2 Solution of the LF-maximization model (4.1)-(4.12) at the worst 
contingency. 
Input: operating 
point 1 in Figure 2.2 
Solution: voltage collapse point in Figure 2.2 
Lagrange multipliers 
Zone Bus 
PG (MW) V (p.u.) QG (MW) V (p.u.) 
λ γ µ 
4072 1391.6 1.025 407.1 1.025 0 0 0 
4071 470 1.03 54.5 1.03 0 0 0 
4011 461 1.05 239 1.05 0 0 0 
4012 626.4 1.044 -117.7 1.044 0 0 0 
1013 492 0.931 -41 0.931 0 0 0 
1012 752 0.926 52.6 0.926 0 0 0 
a 
1014 400 0.957 112.6 0.957 0 0 0 
4021 282 1.1 102.4 1.1 -0.033 0.033 0 
4031 329 0.996 119.4 0.929 -0.903 0. 903 0 
4042 658 0.983 0 1.004 -1.404 0 1. 404 
4041 282 0.956 102.4 0.894 -1.310 1.310 0 
2032 799 0.912 168.9 0.912 0 0 0 
1022 235 0.952 85.3 0.926 -0.558 0. 558 0 
b 
1021 478.8 1.017 130.8 1.017 0 0 0 
4062 564 0.954 167.6 0.954 0 0 0 
4063 1128 0.943 175.9 0.943 0 0 0 
4051 658 0.922 167.9 0.922 0 0 0 
4047 800 0.947 0 0.953 -1.774 0 1. 774 
1043 188 0.937 68.2 0.911 -1.862 1.862 0 
c 
1042 376 0.9 -23.3 0.9 0 0 0 
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levels. On the other hand, the impact of reactive power from the generators at buses 
4021, 1022, and 1043, represented by the magnitude of λ at these buses, has 
decreased due to the increase in the voltage levels at these buses following the 
contingency. The value of λ for the generator at Bus 4051 has been reduced to zero, 
since it is no longer required to operate at its full reactive power capacity under the 
new conditions associated with the contingency. As a result of the contingency and 
the associated changes in the power flow throughout the system, the two generators 
at Buses 4042 and 4047 have reached their minimum reactive power limits 
following  the  increase in the voltage levels at these two buses; hence, λ in this case 
will be accompanied by µ, and not γ, and its magnitude represents the impact of 









4021 4031 4042 4041 4051 4047 1022 1043
Generator Bus
No Contingency Worst Contingency
 
Figure 4.5 Comparison between the value of λ at no contingency and at the worst 
contingency. 
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4.3.2 Determining the Optimal Set of Contracted Generator 
Once the reactive power marginal benefits have been d termined, the next step is to 
obtain the optimal set of reactive power providers using the GRPC algorithm 
proposed in Section 4.2.4 to maximize SAF. The initial regions of reactive power 
operation are first identified using initial values of QGg together with the value of γg, 
as depicted in the flow chart given in Figure 4.1. This initial classification of the 
generators into three operating regions is then used to solve the OPF model (4.14)- 
(4.25) to obtain the first solution set, which is then updated following the algorithm 
depicted in Figure 4.2. The updating process yields the final solution that includes 
the required set of generators to be contracted for reactive power service provision 
and the zonal uniform reactive power price components.  
The reactive power procurement market model is examined considering the 
following two cases: 
• Case I: Unstressed condition, with seasonal “low” load and no 
contingencies. The Lagrange multipliers λg, γg, and µg shown in Table 4.1 
are used here. 
• Case II: Stressed condition, with increased load with respect to Case I and 
considering contingencies. The Lagrange multipliers λg, γg, and µg are 
calculated for the worst contingency, as explained in Section 4.2.2, in this 
case. 
 
 For brevity of presentation, only two “extreme” loading cases are considered 
here to demonstrate the different procurement plans obtained from the proposed 
optimization model. However, in practice, multiple unstressed and stressed 
conditions should be studied by the ISO to arrive at its own set (or sets) of 
Chapter-4 A Procurement Scheme for Reactive Power Services 
 
96 
contracted generators. The ISO should then decide, based on its policies, directives, 
and market structure whether to contract the universal set of generators determined 
from all scenarios, only those associated with the worst contingencies, or only those 
associated with peak load conditions. 
Case I 
A typical low demand scenario is considered in thisca e, providing the ISO with a 
condition where generators are expected to be operating in under-excited mode. 
Applying the reactive power procurement procedures explained in Section 4.2, the 
initial value obtained for SAF was 1,766 $/h. The solution was then improved using 
the GRPC algorithm depicted in Figure 4.2, where two updates were required in the 
first iteration, increasing the value of SAF to 1,969 $/h. This value remained the 
same for several iterations, indicating that this is the best local solution that could 
be reached. 
The final solution depicted in Table 4.3 provides the list of generators 
contracted by the ISO, and the zone-wise uniform reactive power price components 
for this case of low demand. As it can be observed, fifteen generators are required 
for reactive power service provisions in this case. G nerators with the negative 
values of QG are operating in Region I (eight of the fifteen in this case), which 
represents the under-excited mode of operation. None f the generators are 
contracted to operate in Region III, and hence none will be contracted to receive the 
opportunity payment component. For the other three price components, the highest 
reactive power offer from contracted generators within a zone is selected as the 
zonal uniform price. For example, in Zone a only two generators, 4012 and 1012, 
are contracted to operate in Region I; and hence the under-excitation price (ρ1) is 
0.59 $/Mvarh, which is the higher of the two generators’ offered prices for this 
component, as shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Final solution for unstressed condition (Case I). 







m0 m1 m2 m3 
QG 
ρo ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 
4072 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.21 238.3 
4071 0.70 0.84 0.84 0.33 NC 
4011 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.29 310.6 
4012 0.61 0.57 0.57 0.21 -160 
1013 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.18 89.3 
1012 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.35 -80 
a 













4021 0.80 0.91 0.91 0.31 -30 
4031 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.36 -40 
4042 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.23 NC 
4041 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.24 -200 
2032 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.29 168.9 
1022 0.75 0.68 0.68 0.23 -25 
b 













4062 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.33 NC 
4063 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.39 54.4 
4051 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.26 24 
4047 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.23 NC 
1043 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.20 -20 
c 
 













Total Marginal Benefit with respect to system security (TMB) 4,914 $/h 
Total Expected Payment by the ISO (TEP) 2,945 $/h 
Objective Function, SAF (SAF = TMB – TEP) 1,969 $/h 
NC = Not Contracted 




There will be instances when the power system is heavily stressed due to 
contingencies and/or high demand conditions. In order to ensure a secure operation 
of the system in this case, reactive power provisions should be determined 
considering worst case scenarios, such as the case pre nted and discussed here. 
In Section 4.3.1, the values of the three Lagrange multipliers λg, γg, and µg 
obtained by solving the OPF (4.1)-(4.12) for the worst contingency were reported 
(Table 4.2). These values are then used to solve the OPF model (4.14)-(4.25), 
obtaining an initial value of SAF of 23,486 $/h. The solution was then updated 
using the GRPC algorithm, with four updates in the first iteration increasing the 
value of SAF to 39,984 $/h. In the second iteration, three more updates for the 
solution took place improving the value of SAF to 55,403 $/h. This value remained 
the same for several iterations indicating that no further improvements were 
possible and the best local solution was reached. 
The final solution for Case II is given in Table 4.4, where twelve generators are 
contracted for reactive power service provision; four f these (generators shown in 
bold) are expected to operate in Region III. However, as none of these four 
generators are located in Zone a, no generators in this zone are contracted to receiv  
an opportunity payment component. Observe also that three of these four generators 
are located in Zone b, where the worst contingency took place. 
Comparing the results of Case I and Case II, the following can be observed: 
• As the system is stressed, the reactive power requirements from generators 
also increase resulting in more generators operating in Region III (4 
generators in Case II versus none in Case I). 
• The  final  value  of  the objective  function SAF in the stressed case is much  
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Table 4.4 Final solution for stressed condition (Case II). 







m0 m1 m2 m3 
QG 
ρo ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 
4072 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.21 233.9 
4071 0.70 0.84 0.84 0.33 NC 
4011 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.29 -77.3 
4012 0.61 0.57 0.57 0.21 NC 
1013 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.18 NC 
1012 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.35 NC 
a 













4021 0.80 0.91 0.91 0.31 -30 
4031 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.36 191.1 
4042 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.23 NC 
4041 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.24 163.8 
2032 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.29 104.5 
1022 0.75 0.68 0.68 0.23 136.5 
b 













4062 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.33 NC 
4063 0.73 0.66 0.66 0.39 211.2 
4051 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.26 182.4 
4047 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.23 NC 
1043 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.20 109.2 
c 
 













Total Marginal Benefit with respect to system security (TMB) 58,709 $/h 
Total Expected Payment by the ISO (TEP) 3,306 $/h 
Objective Function, SAF (SAF = TMB – TEP) 55,403 $/h 
NC = Not Contracted 
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higher than the unstressed case. To explain this, notice that SAF has two 
components, namely the Total Marginal Benefit (TMB) with respect to 
system security, and the Total Expected Payment (TEP) by the ISO. It can 
be seen from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 that the TEP only increased by 361 $/h, 
while  the  TMB  increased  significantly  from  4,914 $/h to 58,709 $/h. The 
TMB “jump” is due to the fact that the benefit to the system from reactive 
power support is much more significant when the system is heavily stressed. 
The more the system is stressed, the higher is its need for reactive power 
support to maintain system security. 
• For the two cases considered, no generator located in Zone a is expected to 
receive an opportunity payment, since none of the generators from this zone 
is contracted to operate in Region III. This was expected, since the values of 
the Lagrange multipliers λg,  γg, and  µg obtained  from  the  LF  
maximization  analysis  for  both Cases I and II are ll zeros for all 
generators in this zone (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). This indicates that the reactive 
power from generators in this zone does not have any effect on system 
security, and hence the procurement model does not seek much reactive 
power from these units. 
• From an optimization point of view, both models have the same number of 
variables and equations, as indicated by the computational statistics depicted 
in Table 4.5. Observe that Case II requires about two and a half times the 
CPU time of Case I to arrive at the solution, since th  SAF-maximization 
model (4.14)-(4.25) is solved sixteen times for the latter compared to only 
eight times for the former. This is to be expected, as more generators are 
pushed to operate in Regions II and III in Case II due to the higher loading 
conditions, as illustrated on Tables 4.3 and 4.4; hence more solution updates 
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are required in this case. 
 








No. of variables 10,323 10,323 






(CPU) time (sec) 
14.35 35.56 
 
4.3.3 Comparison of Zonal Uniform Pricing with System-Wide Uniform 
Pricing 
In order to emphasize the advantages of the zonal uniform pricing scheme over a 
system-wide uniform price, the two cases discussed earlier are solved considering a 
uniform price for the four reactive price components, i.e. the whole system is 
treated as a single zone. The resulting prices for the two case studies are shown in 
Table 4.6. 
Comparing the results in Table 4.6 with those obtained earlier in Tables 4.3 
and 4.4, it can be observed that there is a reduction in the value of the SAF for both 
cases when a system-wide uniform reactive power pricing scheme is adopted (e.g. 
the SAF with zonal uniform pricing is 1,969 $/h in Case I, while it is 1,649 $/h with 
system-wide uniform pricing). In Case II, this reduction is not very significant, as 
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the value of QG in both pricing approaches remains the same, and hence the 
marginal benefit component in SAF, which is high in Case II, does not change. 
However, the expected payments, which are functions of price components, are 
affected; thus, the TEP for the uniform price approach compared to the zonal price 
approach increases 11% for the unstressed case and 17% for the stressed case. This 
shows that using a zonal pricing mechanism not only reduces the risk of market 
power, but it also reduces the payment burden on the ISO. 
 
Table 4.6 Results for a system-wide uniform pricing mechanism. 
Price component Case I Case II 
Availability Price 0.92 0.92 
Under-excitation Price 0.91 0.91 
Over-excitation Price 0.86 0.90 
Opportunity Price 0 0.36 
SAF 1,649 $/h 54,849 $/h 
TEP 3,265 $/h 3,860 $/h 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, a novel seasonal procurement scheme for reactive power ancillary 
services is proposed and discussed. The procurement scheme is based on a two-step 
optimization process. The first step consists of determining the marginal benefits of 
reactive power with respect to system security, which are then used in the second 
step to maximize a reactive power societal advantage function, considering offers 
from service providers. Reactive power is procured from generators on a zonal 
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basis. The solution of the proposed procurement model yields the optimal set of 
contracted generators in each zone and the corresponding zonal reactive power 
price components that would form the basis of contractual agreements for seasonal 
reactive power provision. 
A computationally efficient GRPC algorithm is developed to solve the 
proposed reactive power procurement model. The proposed algorithm avoids the 
need for binary variables, thus keeping the optimization problem as an NLP; hence, 
it can easily be applied to realistic power systems while incorporating all 
transmission system security constraints.  
 The CIGRE 32-bus system is used as a sample system to demonstrate the 
feasibility of the proposed procurement scheme and the proposed solution 
technique. Two extreme case studies, representing unstressed and stressed operating 
conditions, are considered. The results show how reactive power requirements from 
generators increase under stressed operating conditions, resulting in four generators 
operating in the opportunity region compared to none in the unstressed condition. 
The results also demonstrate that the benefit of reactive power support is much 
more significant to the system when it is heavily stre sed, illustrating the 
importance of reactive power in maintaining a secur operation of the power 
system. A comparison between a zonal reactive power pricing approach and a 
system-wide uniform pricing approach is carried out; the results of this comparison 
show how zonal pricing can reduce the payment burden on the ISO. 
 The next chapter discusses the development of reactiv  power dispatch 
procedures, based on the reactive power market framework proposed in Chapter 3 
and the optimally procured set of reactive power contracts, and their corresponding 




1Preliminarily findings of this chapter have been published in the proceedings of the 2007 
IEEE-PES General Meeting in Tampa, Florida [73], and the complete work presented has 




Redefining the Reactive Power Dispatch Problem1 
5.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 4, an optimal reactive power service procu ement scheme is presented, 
which represents the first level of the two-settlement framework for reactive power 
ancillary service provision proposed earlier in Chapter 3. The solution of the long-
term procurement model yields a set of contracted gnerators and four reactive 
power price components, namely the availability, under- and over-excitation, and 
opportunity components. The second level of the proposed framework, which 
determines the reactive power dispatch levels in “real-time”, is the main focus of 
the research work presented in this chapter.  
A novel reactive power dispatch framework is proposed in this chapter, which 
redefines the problem to suit the ISO requirements i  the context of competitive 
electricity markets. The proposed model seeks to minimize the total payments 
associated with reactive power dispatched from servic  providers. To adhere to 
existing FERC regulations [1], only reactive power support from generators is 
considered as an ancillary service eligible for financial compensation in the work 
presented in this thesis. 
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5.2 The Proposed Reactive Power Dispatch Model 
Based on the proposed reactive power dispatch scheme d picted in Figure 3.3, the 
ISO should be able to execute an optimal dispatch program to arrive at the required 
amount of reactive power in the real-time operation stage. A reactive power 
dispatch model is proposed here, taking into account both the economic and 
technical issues associated with service provisions in a competitive electricity 
market. 
 The proposed model seeks to minimize the following objective function J, 
which represents the total payments associated with reactive power dispatch: 
 



























































         (5.1) 
 
Where, 
QG1g:    Under-excitation reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QG2g:    Over-excitation reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QG3g:  Reactive power of generator g operating in the opportunity region, 
in p.u. 
Sb:  Base MVA power (assumed here to be 100 MVA). 
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ρ0g: Availability price component for reactive power for generator g, in 
$/h.  
ρ1g: Under-excitation price component for reactive power for generator 
g, in $/Mvarh.  
ρ2g: Over-excitation price component for reactive power for generator g, 
in $/Mvarh.  
ρ3g: Lost opportunity price component for reactive power for generator 
g, in $/Mvar2h. 
ρB1:  Price of upward balance services PB, in $/MWh.  
ρB2:  Price of downward balance services PB, in $/MWh. 
PB1i:  Upward balance service at bus i, in p.u.   
PB2i:  Downward balance service at bus i, in p.u.  
ρMC:  Energy market clearing price, in $/MWh. 
PL:   Total system losses, in p.u. 
PLo:  Pre-determined total system losses from energy market clearing, in 
p.u.   
QGbg
lead:  Base leading reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGbg
lag:   Base lagging reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
QGAg:   Maximum reactive power limit of generator g without reduction in 
real power generation, in p.u. 
W1g, W2g:  Binary variables associated with Regions I and II of reactive power 
operation for generator g, respectively. 
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W3rg, W3fg: Binary variables associated with armature and field limits on 
reactive power generation for generator g, espectively. 
 
These payments can be divided into the following three main categories:  
• Payment J1 is associated with reactive power provided from generators. 
This component is a function of the predetermined price components 
associated with each region of operation (ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3), as explained in 
Section 3.4.3. Accordingly, payment components are det rmined for QG1, 
QG2, and QG3 corresponding to the operation of the generator in Region I, 
II, or III, respectively, plus an availability payment. 
• Payment J2 is associated with the energy balance service that is required to 
compensate for rescheduling of real power, i. . the effect of reactive power 
dispatch on real power dispatch. This component will appear only when 
some generators are required to supply reactive power in Region III, where 
they need to reduce their real power generation in order to meet the system 
reactive power requirement. Consequently, there is a need to reschedule 
their real power (∆PG), and a balance service (PB) is required at certain 
buses to compensate for real power deviations from already dispatched 
values (PGo). The energy balance services from available providers might 
be an upward or downward service, i.e. PB1 and PB2, respectively; the 
corresponding prices ρB1 and ρB2 are assumed to be known in advance 
from an energy balance market [75].  
• Payment/credit J3 is associated with the change in the total system losses 
due to reactive power dispatch and the rescheduling of real power 
generation. This component is positive (payment) when the total losses 
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calculated from the proposed reactive power dispatch solution (PL) are 
higher than the losses from real power market clearing dispatch (PLo). If 
the proposed reactive power dispatch model yields lower losses than PLo, a 
loss credit (negative value) is in effect. The value of the payment or credit 
can be calculated by multiplying this difference (PL - PLo) by the market 
clearing price (ρMC).      
The proposed reactive power dispatch model is then formulated as follows: 
 
Jmax.                (5.2) 
( ) iYVVPPPPPts
j
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22 cos25.0 δδ                (5.16) 
 
Where,  
J: Total payment associated with the reactive power dispatch in $/h. 
PGoi:  Market clearing pre-determined active power dispatch at bus i, in 
p.u. 
∆PGi:  Reduction in active power at bus i due to increase in reactive power 
beyond heating limits, in p.u. 
PDi:   Active power demand at bus i, in p.u. 
Vi:   Voltage magnitude at bus i, in p.u. 
δi:   Voltage angle at bus i, in radians. 
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Yij:   Magnitude of the ij  entry of the admittance (Y) matrix, in p.u. 
θij:  Angle of the ij  entry of the admittance (Y) matrix, in radians. 
QGi:   Reactive power generation at bus i, in p.u. 
QDi:   Reactive power demand at bus i, in p.u. 
Vi
min:      Minimum allowable voltage at bus i, in p.u. 
Vi
max:     Maximum allowable voltage at bus i, in p.u. 
Pij:   Power flow from bus i to bus j, in p.u. 
Pij
max:   Maximum allowable power flow from bus i to bus j, in p.u.  
QGg
min:   Minimum reactive power limit of generator g, in p.u. 
QGBg:   Maximum allowable reactive power limit of generator g with 
reduction in real power generation, in p.u. 
QGmg:   Mandatory reactive power of generator g, in p.u. 
Wmg:  Binary variable associated with mandatory reactive power 
production for generator g. 
Vtg:  Terminal voltage of generator g at which its capability curves are 
calculated, in p.u. (assumed here to be 1.05 p.u.) 
Iag: Rated armature current of generator g at which its capability curves 
are calculated, in p.u. 
Efg: Excitation voltage of generator g, in p.u.  
Xsg: Synchronous reactance of generator g, in p.u. 
PGxg:  New active power dispatch for generator g, in p.u. 
ci:  Maximum allowed level of active power reduction at bus i. 




max: Maximum upward balance service at bus i, in p.u.   
PB2i
max: Maximum downward balance service at bus i, in p.u.  
Z:  The set of generators in zone z.  
Kz:  A fractional cap on reactive power usage in zone z. 
Gij:   Conductance of the line connecting buses i and j, in p.u. 
 
 In the above model, equations (5.3) and (5.4) are the active and reactive power 
balance equations; observe that the nodal active power equation (5.3) is 
appropriately modified to include ∆PG, PB1 and PB2. System security limits, 
including bus voltage limits and line flow limits, are given by (5.5) and (5.6), 
respectively. The three regions of reactive power production identified from the 
generator’s capability curves (Figure 2.1) are given by the constraints in (5.7). It is 
to be noted that the constraints (5.7)-(5.9) guarantee that of the three regions QG1, 
QG2, and QG3, only one is selected at a time for each generator.  
 The effect of reactive power dispatch on real power dispatch is included in the 
model by calculating the required reduction in real power dispatch (∆PG) using 
(5.10)-(5.12). Observe that ∆PG will have a non-zero value only if the generator is 
operating in Region III, i.e. if the generator reaches its field limit (PGA < PGR) or 
armature limit (PGA > PGR); otherwise, PGx in (5.10) will be equal to PGo and hence, 
according to (5.11), ∆PG will be zero. In order to minimize the effect on real power 
dispatch, a “cap” on the reduction in real power is imposed, e.g. between 5 to 15%, 
as per constraint (5.12). 
 The ISO will require some balancing mechanism to compensate for the 
reschedule in real power and for changes in system losses as a result of the reactive 
power dispatch. In this work, it is assumed that such a market mechanism, i.e. 
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upward and downward balance services, is already in place as an ancillary service. 
This is typically the case in most markets, and thus can be used by the ISO within 
the proposed reactive power dispatch framework. A limit on the maximum upward 
and downward balance service available at each system bus is imposed by the 
constraints (5.13) and (5.14), respectively. 
 Based on typical voltage control approaches, constrai ts (5.15) are included to 
ensure sufficient reactive power reserves within a voltage control zone. The amount 
of reactive power reserves in zone z is given by (1 – Kz); for example, Kz = 0.9 
corresponds to a 90% cap on utilization and dispatch of available reactive power 
capacity, implying a 10% reactive power reserve in the zone. Observe that the value 
of QGA instead of QGB was used to define the zonal reactive power reserv in order 
to be more conservative, since the extra reactive power coming from a possible real 
power re-dispatch is unknown at the start of the dispatch process. Finally, the total 
system losses PL in (5.1) are calculated using (5.16).  
 It is important to highlight the fact that the proosed payment function J given 
in (5.1) is of a generic nature, and it can be modifie  to fit other payment schemes 
adopted by system operators. For example, it was mentioned earlier that both the 
IESO in Ontario and the ISO New England compensate the generators operating at 
the opportunity region by directly paying them a lost pportunity component at the 
market clearing price. To consider such cases, the obj ctive function can be readily 
modified as follows to represent such a payment mechanism: 
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Observe that the quadratic opportunity cost term in (5.1) has been replaced by a 
direct payment for rescheduled power ρMC∆PG in (5.17). Furthermore, loss 
payments/credits are not included, since this is not currently a common practice in 
“standard” reactive power dispatch approaches.  
The proposed dispatch model (5.2)-(5.16) captures both the technical and 
economic aspects of reactive power dispatch. However, from the optimization point 
of view, this model represents a difficult problem, since it is essentially an MINLP 
problem, due to the presence of binary variables requi d to properly select only 
one out of the three regions of reactive power operation in the model. To address 
this issue, the proposed GRPC algorithm discussed earlier in Section 4.2.4 is also 
used here to solve this optimization problem.  
 The solution of the proposed dispatch model yields the following:  
• The required reactive power support from each generator.  
• The amount of real power to be rescheduled in order to meet the system 
reactive power requirements.  
• The amount of energy balance services needed to compensate for the change 
in real power resulting from the reactive power dispatch.  
• The total payment of the ISO to the service providers. 
5.3 Implementation and Results 
The proposed reactive power dispatch model (5.2)-(5.16) is tested on the CIGRE 
32-bus system (Figure 4.3), and the associated results are presented and discussed 
in this section. The optimization models, which aretransformed into NLP problems 
as previously discussed in Section 4.2.4, are modeled in GAMS and solved using 
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the MINOS solver. The same power flow limits used in Section 4.3, are also used 
here. To simplify the analysis, all generators are gain assumed to be eligible for 
payments in all of the three regions of operation, which implies that QGb
lead and 
QGb
lag in Figure 2.1 are equal to zero for all generators. Finally, a 30% reactive 
power reserve is assumed for each zone, i.e. Kz = 0.7 for all three zones. 
 For brevity of presentation, only two different operating scenarios are 
presented and discussed here to illustrate the performance, validity, and robustness 
of the proposed reactive power dispatch model. The first scenario is a base loading 
condition, whereas the second is a “stressed” operating condition in which the 
system loading level is increased by 10% with respect to base load and with one 
generating unit out of service. For each of these scenarios, the following cases are 
studied: 
• Case I (“standard” reactive power dispatch): In this case, common ISO-
practices are applied, where the real power dispatch from energy market 
clearing is used to solve an ac-power flow to determine the required 
reactive power dispatch. In most cases, operators use their own experience 
to “tune” the ac-power flow until a feasible and secure solution is achieved 
that does not violate voltage and line flow limits. Hence, this approach is 
simulated here to obtain a “standard” reactive power dispatch, and the 
associated payments are then calculated based on the proposed payment 
function J1 in (5.1). 
• Case II (proposed reactive power dispatch): In this case, the real power 
dispatch from energy market clearing, together with the set of contracted 
generators and the four reactive power price components from a 
procurement stage, are used to solve the proposed reactive power dispatch 
model (5.2)-(5.16). The solution of this model simultaneously yields the 
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required reactive power dispatch and the associated payment components. 
In order to demonstrate the generality of the proposed dispatch model, the 
results are compared for two objectives, one with the function J given in 
(5.1), denoted here by Case II.a, and the second with the more “realistic” 
objective J* given in (5.17), denoted here by Case II.b. 
• Case III (“ideal” reactive power dispatch): This case simulates an ideal 
scenario in which a security constrained ac-OPF, mini izing the total real 
power cost, is used to simultaneously dispatch P and Q. This would be an 
ideal solution because it achieves the least-cost solu ion; however, such an 
approach is not currently used by ISOs in practice, b cause of the 
complexity associated with solving a coupled, large-scale, non-convex 
NLP model every few minutes. Furthermore, possible adverse effects on 
market prices associated with the simultaneous dispatch of real and 
reactive power within a competitive market environment could be a 
significant problem [28]. Once the reactive power dispatch is obtained for 
this ideal scenario, the associated reactive power payment is calculated 
based on the proposed J1 in (2). 
 
 In the above cases, the four reactive power price components, defined earlier in 
Section 3.4.3, are assumed to be available from the procurement stage. These price 
components, as well as the set of contracted generators, are obtained here by 
solving the proposed reactive power procurement model (4.14)-(4.25) at high 
loading conditions and ignoring contingencies. These values are different from the 
ones shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4; however, the way the contracted generators and 
the associated price components are obtained have no bearing on the proposed 
dispatch procedures, and they could actually come from any appropriate 
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procurement process. The set of contracted generators nd the four reactive power 
price components are given in Table 5.1, and are assumed to remain unchanged for 
all test cases. A market clearing price ρMC = 100 $/MWh is assumed, which is a 
typical “high” price figure in the Ontario electricity market. The prices of energy 
balance services ρB1 = 110 $/MWh and ρB2 = 90 $/MWh are assumed to be pre-
determined from a given energy balance auction, which can be assumed to be 
typical values, since these are usually around the value of ρMC [76].  
 
Table 5.1 Contracted generators and the associated reactive power prices. 
 
NC = Not Contracted 
 
Zonal Reactive Power Prices 
Zone 
Contracted 
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It should be noted that reactive power limits for the “standard” reactive power 
dispatch Case I and the “ideal” reactive power dispatch Case III do not include the 
opportunity region of operation. This is due to the fact that in the “traditional” 
reactive power dispatch approaches, which both of tese cases represent, generators 
are typically modeled using fixed reactive power limits (QGR in Figure 2.1). The 
redefined reactive power dispatch proposed herein (Case II), on the other hand, is 
based on the concept of operating a generator in the opportunity region in return for 
adequate financial compensation. This allows for extended reactive power support 
from generators, which is important for power systems today, since they are 
operating closer to their limits in more stressed conditions. 
5.3.1 Base Loading Condition 
The solution of the three case studies under base loading conditions is given in 
Table 5.2. A set of 13 generators out of 20 are assumed to be contracted for reactive 
power provision (Table 5.1). Generators with negative QG values are operating in 
the under-excitation region (Region I); no generators are operating in Region III. 
For the purpose of the simulations presented here, the real power market clearing 
and dispatch, which is required to initiate the proposed reactive power dispatch 
procedure, is obtained using a “standard” dc-OPF model. This model minimizes the 
cost of energy production, subject to system security constraints. Transmission 
losses are modeled as a function of generator shift factors and real power injections 
[77].  
 It can be seen from the results in Table 5.2 that in Case I, when reactive power 
is dispatched using an ac-power flow (AC-PF), a 5.7 MW reduction in the real 
power of the slack bus (4011) takes place to adjust for the lower losses. Note also 
that the same PG dispatch (obtained from dc-OPF) applies to both Case II.a and 
Case II.b. None of the generators are operating in Region III for these sub-cases, 
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and hence ∆PG is zero for all the generators. However, due to the fact that real 
power generation levels are kept constant and there is no slack bus in Case II, a 
downward balance service of 7.1 MW is required at generator Bus 1021 for Case 
II.a to account for the reduction in the total system losses. The difference in QG 
between these two sub-cases is due to the differenc in payment structure of the two 
objective functions. Finally, observe the significantly different PG and QG values 
obtained from the security constrained ac-OPF approach in Case III, which 
minimizes the total real power generation costs. 
  




Proposed dispatch model 
Case III 
AC-OPF 
















4072 1380.6 484 1380.6 179.3 1380.6 179.6 1590.6 394.5 
4011 900 - 5.7 -100 900 -89.2 900 -77.5 539.8 -100 
4021 270 -2.4 270 -30 270 -30 270 -30 
4031 315 -23.1 315 -40 315 -40 315 -40 
4063 1035.4 103.4 1035.4 92.4 1035.4 97.1 1080 106.2 
4051 630 97.4 630 83.6 630 90.7 630 92.9 
2032 760 168.9 760 10.9 760 15 765 23.3 
1013 275.5 -50 275.5 0 275.5 -50 383.9 -50 
1012 720 57.4 720 0 720 275.8 720 70 
1022 225 -25 225 0 225 0 225 -25 
1021 350 51.7 350-7.1 0 350 0 430.2 84.4 
1043 180 69.2 180 55 180 63.9 180 65.1 
1042 360 -37.4 360 -40 360 -38.9 360 -38.8 
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Observe in Table 5.2 that there are significant differences in reactive power 
dispatch using the proposed approach (Case II) withrespect to more “traditional” 
techniques (Cases I and III). This is a notable change arising from the proposed 
philosophy of reactive power dispatch, which is a basic paradigm shift. 
 The reactive power payment, the balance payment, and the total system losses 
for all cases are given in Table 5.3. Observe that e reactive power payment 
resulting from the proposed dispatch model (Case II) is the lowest, since the 
objective function is to minimize reactive power payments. It is also to be noted 
that this base-load scenario does not induce any reactiv  power dispatch of 
generators in the opportunity region, and therefore the difference in opportunity 
payment components between Cases II.a and II.b is not clearly brought out. A 
stressed operating condition is considered in the next section to demonstrate this 
issue. 
 









The balance payment shown in Table 5.3 and associated wi h Case II.a is due 
to the downward balance service required at generator Bus 1021, illustrated in 
Table 5.2, which arises from the need to account for he change in system losses 
Case II: Proposed 






Losses (MW) 433.5 432.2 439.2 424.4 
Q-Payment ($/h) 1,900 1,570 1,780 1,920 
Balance-Payment 
($/h) 
515 640 0 0 
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associated with the corresponding reactive power dispatch. This balance-payment is 
lower in Case I, where a 5.7 MW reduction in the losses is accounted for by 
Generator 4011 (slack bus). Note that Case III yields the lowest value of the system 
losses, since both PG and QG are simultaneously dispatched using an ac-OPF. On 
the other hand, the system losses in Case II.a are lower than those in Case II.b, since 
for the former the objective function J explicitly includes a loss-payment 
component. 
5.3.2 Stressed Operating Condition 
Table 5.4 depicts the dispatch results obtained for the stressed system conditions. 
Observe in this case that the reactive power requirments have significantly 
increased for all the studied cases. In Case I, a rescheduling in real power 
generation of three generators is needed to achieve a feasible power flow solution; 
in this case the 9 MW (1.25%) reduction in PG from Generator 1022 is picked up by 
Generator 4072, and an additional 9.7 MW is supplied by the slack bus 4011 to 
account for the increase in system losses associated with the reactive power 
dispatch. 
In Cases II.a and II.b, Generator 1012 is dispatched in the opportunity region 
(shown in bold), and consequently a 11.7 MW (1.63%) reduction in its real power 
output is necessary to maintain reactive power generation within its field limits. 
This rescheduling in real power is compensated by an upward balance service of 
11.4 MW in Case II.a and 12.1 MW in Case II.b, both a  load Bus 1041. The 
difference between the MW reduction and the balance service is accounted for by 
the change in the total system losses. In Case III, there is no rescheduling of real 
power generation, since PG and QG are simultaneously dispatched. 
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4072 2310.3+9 303.5 2310.3 319.3 2310.3 297.4 2279.3 422.3 
4011 900+9.7 -100 900 -100 900 -32.5 804.1 -100 
4021 270 -30 270 -30 270 -30 270 -30 
4031 315 -40 315 0 315 0 315 128.8 
4063 1080 152.7 1080 156.8 1080 159.1 1080 163.6 
4051 630 247.9 630 98.5 630 95.6 630 122.8 
2032 765 175.6 765 201.1 765 179.9 765 212.5 
1013 350.1 236.7 350.1 76.9 350.1 45.7 481.9 -50 
1012 720-9 349 720-11.7 367 720-11.7 367 720 348.7 
1022 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 391.4 88 391.4 156.5 391.4 157.8 540 213.6 
1043 180 87.2 180 87.2 180 87.2 180 87.2 
1042 360 16.3 360 0 360 0 360 -7.8 
1041
load 
0 0 11.4 0 12.1 0 0 0 
 
 The reactive power and balance payments, as well as the total system losses for 
all cases, are given in Table 5.5. Observe that the low st reactive power payment is 
achieved in Case II.a, with the payment being significantly different from that in 
Case II.b because of the difference in the opportunity payment component in the 
respective objective functions. Note that the balance payment component is present 
in Cases I and II due to the required rescheduling in real power generation. The 
difference in the balance-payment for Cases II.a and II.b can be attributed to the 
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slight difference in the total system losses associated with the reactive power 
dispatch. 
 It is interesting to note that for the stressed system conditions, the proposed 
dispatch of Case II.a reduces system losses with respect to the ac-OPF dispatch of 
Case III. This is attributed here to the fact that t e proposed dispatch model has the 
possibility to extend the reactive power limits to a generator’s opportunity region, 
while an ac-OPF based reactive power dispatch constrai  these to fixed rated 
limits. 
 








Comparing the reactive power dispatch results of Case II.a for the two system 
conditions, it is observed that for base load (Table 5.2), 4 generators are operating 
in the under-excitation region and 4 are not dispatched for reactive power support, 
while none are required to operate in Region III. On the other hand, from  
Table 5.4, a significant increase is observed in reactive power output from 
generators under a stressed operating condition, as expected, since only two 
Case II: Proposed 






Losses (MW) 567.5 557.4 558.2 575 
Q-Payment ($/h) 2,420 2,190 3,340 2,510 
Balance-Payment 
($/h) 
2,060 1,250 1,330 0 
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generators are operating in the under-excitation region, while Generator 1012 is 
operating in Region III. The total amount of reactive power injected into the system 
has increased from 220 Mvar at base loading condition to 1333 Mvar under stressed 
operating condition. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, a novel paradigm for reactive power dispatch in the context of 
deregulation is proposed. The classical reactive power dispatch problem is 
redefined from the perspective of an ISO’s operating in competitive electricity 
markets. The new reactive power dispatch model incorporates the ISO’s composite 
payment burden associated with the provision of reactive power support, while 
considering all operating aspects pertinent to a competitive environment. The model 
seeks to minimize the total payment by the ISO to reactive power providers, while 
ensuring a secure and reliable operation of the power system. 
 One important contribution of the model is that it considers the effect of 
reactive power on real power by “internalizing” the calculation of the reduction in 
real power output of a generator due to an increase in its reactive power supply. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure that rescheduling of real power because of reactive 
power supply requirements from generators is kept at a minimum, a payment 
component for balance services is included in the obj ctive function. 
 Simulation studies are carried out considering twodifferent loading scenarios. 
Furthermore, three cases are considered representing different approaches for 
reactive power dispatch. Thus, in addition to the proposed reactive power dispatch 
model, two other approaches are studied: First, a standard approach adopted by 
most system operators for dispatching reactive power support from generators is 
used; this approach is based on solving an ac-power flow using real power dispatch 
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from energy market clearing. The second approach is an ideal scenario in which 
both real and reactive power are simultaneously dispatched by solving a security 
constrained ac-OPF that minimizes the total real power cost.  
 From the analysis of results obtained from the thre case studies, it is shown 
that the proposed reactive power dispatch yields the lowest reactive power 
payments among all cases considered. It is also observed that the proposed reactive 





6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis focuses on the management and pricing of reactive power ancillary 
services in the context of liberalized electricity markets. In Chapter 1, a 
comprehensive review of reactive power management and pricing is carried out. 
The review includes some of the existing utility practices worldwide as well as 
various approaches reported in the technical literature for reactive power cost 
allocation, pricing, and provision. Subsequently, the research work proposed in this 
thesis is presented, highlighting its main objectives.    
   In Chapter 2, the different types of ancillary services according to FERC and 
NERC definitions are presented and elaborated. An overview of reactive power 
management in different electric utilities around the world is discussed thereafter. 
This chapter also introduces the different regions f reactive power operation 
determined from the capability curve of a synchronous generator, and introduces 
the different cost components associated with each region. The impact of reactive 
power on system security is also discussed, and the chapter concludes by 
emphasizing on the importance of incorporating system security within the reactive 
power provision procedures.  
   In Chapter 3, the various issues associated with the existing utility practices for 
reactive power management and payment mechanisms are discussed. Appropriate 




for reactive power ensuring a secure and reliable op ration of the power system. 
The proposed policy solutions include the following:  
• Decoupling of active and reactive power provisions in order to isolate the 
effect of price volatility of energy market on reactive power prices. 
• Examining reactive power management on a zonal basis, to reduce the effect 
of some generators’ trying to exercise market power by confining any 
possible market inefficiencies within a specific zone, and thus protect other 
market participants in the system. 
• The development of an appropriate reactive power payment function that 
comprises four price components, corresponding to the three regions of 
reactive power operating (under-excitation, over-excitation, and opportunity 
regions), in addition to an availability component. 
• Proper consideration and representation of the effect of reactive power 
dispatch on real power dispatch, and hence system security.  
 
Based on these policy solutions, a novel hierarchical reactive power management 
framework is proposed and discussed in this chapter. The proposed framework is 
based on the separation of reactive power management into two distinct time-
frames, i.e. a reactive power procurement stage carried out on a seasonal basis, and 
a reactive power dispatch stage that determines the actual reactive power generation 
levels close to real-time.   
 In Chapter 4, a novel reactive power procurement scheme is proposed 
representing the first level of the integrated framework. The scheme incorporates, 
for the first time, power system security as a selection criterion in the procurement 




benefits of reactive power from a generator with respect to system security, 
represented by Lagrange multipliers associated with a loadability maximization 
model. These marginal benefits are then used to maximize a reactive power societal 
advantage function, considering offers from service providers, i.e. generators. 
Reactive power is procured from generators on a zonl basis, with the system being 
split into zones or voltage control areas using the concept of electrical distances. 
The optimal reactive power procurement model is solved using a novel GRPC 
algorithm, which alleviates the need for binary variables. The GRPC algorithm 
solves the procurement problem using an iterative updating procedure, in which a 
sequence of NLP sub-problems is solved until the best possible solution is achieved. 
The proposed GRPC algorithm, from the computational viewpoint, makes it 
possible to apply the proposed reactive power procurement model to realistic power 
systems, while incorporating all transmission security constraints. The proposed 
reactive power procurement model is implemented and tested on the CIGRE 32-bus 
system, and two case studies are considered, representing stressed and unstressed 
operating conditions. The solution of the proposed procurement model yields the 
optimal set of contracted generators in each zone and the corresponding zonal 
reactive power prices for all the four price components introduced in Chapter 3; 
these would form the basis of contractual agreements for seasonal reactive power 
provision. 
 In Chapter 5, the classical reactive power dispatch problem is redefined from 
the perspective of an ISO operating in competitive el ctricity markets. A novel 
reactive power dispatch scheme is proposed, which seeks to minimize the total 
payments by the ISO to reactive power providers while ensuring a secure and 
reliable operation of the power system. The proposed reactive power dispatch 
scheme considers the effect of reactive power on real power by calculating, within 




due to an increase in its reactive power supply. This reduction in real power 
generation is compensated by using upwards and downwards balance services. A 
payment component for these balance services is included in the proposed objective 
function, in order to ensure that rescheduling of real power is kept at a minimum. 
Two different operating scenarios are considered in the CIGRE 32-bus system, and 
three cases are studied for each scenario, representing different approaches to 
reactive power dispatch. In addition to the proposed reactive power dispatch model, 
a “standard” approach adopted by most system operators for dispatching reactive 
power support from generators is used, as well as using an ideal scenario in which 
both real and reactive power are simultaneously dispatched by solving a security 
constrained ac-OPF that minimizes the total real power cost. The findings of this 
chapter demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed reactive power dispatch, 
which yields the lowest reactive power payments and better overall results among 
all cases considered.  
6.2 Main Contributions of the Research 
The following are the main contributions of the research work presented in this 
thesis: 
1. A comprehensive overview for reactive power ancillary services 
management and pricing is presented, discussing different mechanisms 
adopted by several utilities around the world, as well as proposed 
approaches reported in the technical literature.  
2. This thesis presents a detailed analysis of the issues associated with reactive 
power service provision in competitive electricity markets, and prescribes 
corresponding policy solutions for them, which are in line with the common 




a comprehensive and general framework for reactive power management 
and pricing in these markets. 
3. Based on current practices for reactive power provisi n by various system 
operators in competitive electricity markets, a novel integrated framework 
based on a two-settlement model approach is proposed for reactive power 
ancillary service management. The proposed framework works at two 
hierarchical levels and in different time horizons; the first level is the 
procurement model which works in a seasonal time horizon, while the 
second level is the dispatch model which works in a30 minutes to 1 hour 
window. The framework is generic in nature and is de igned to fit into any 
electricity market structure, be it a bilateral contract market or a pool 
market. 
4. System security is incorporated in reactive power procurement procedures, 
based on indices representing the marginal benefit of reactive power from 
each generator with respect to system security. Furthermore, appropriate 
transmission security constraints are represented in the model to ensure a 
secure procurement of reactive power support.  
5. A novel reactive power dispatch model is proposed to suit the requirements 
of system operators in deregulated market. The main objective of this model 
is to dispatch reactive power from already contracted providers at least cost, 
while satisfying transmission security constraints and considering zonal 
reactive power reserves. 
6. An important aspect of the new dispatch model is that it considers the effect 
of reactive power on real power by internalizing the calculation of the 
reduction in real power output of a generator due to an increase in its 




of real power is kept at a minimum, a payment component for balance 
services is included in the objective function. 
7. A novel Generator Reactive Power Classification (GRPC) algorithm is 
proposed in this thesis to solve the MINLP models as ociated with the 
optimal reactive power procurement and dispatch problems. The GRPC 
algorithm treats the optimization problem as iterative NLP sub-problems, 
alleviating the need for binary variables associated with the different 
possible regions of reactive power operation for each generator. This is a 
significant improvement from previously inefficient mathematical models 
and methods that treat the reactive power procurement problem as an 
MINLP problem.  
 
6.3 Scope for Future Research 
Based on the research work reported in this thesis, future research may be pursued 
in the following directions: 
1. Apply the proposed reactive power procurement and dispatch models to 
actual power systems.  
2. Examine the possibility of expanding the definition f reactive power 
ancillary service providers to include other resources such as capacitor 
banks and FACTS devices. This is in line with FERC recent 
recommendations to consider and recognize reactive power from these 




3. Improve the performance of the proposed GRPC algorithm by looking at the 
optimal order of generators and starting point (initial value of reactive 
power), in order to arrive at the best possible soluti n.  
4. Study the issue of reactive power providers’ trying to exercise market power 
and indulging in gaming. 
5. Investigate the contribution of DG resources to reactive power ancillary 
service provision, their optimal pricing, grid connection agreements, and 
technical requirements.  
6. Examine reactive power provision and pricing problems from the 
generators’ viewpoint, as service providers. In other words, build optimal 
bidding strategies for the competitive generators t participate in reactive 
power markets.  
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Appendix A  
CIGRE 32-Bus System 
The CIGRE 32-bus test system [71], shown in Figure A.1, has been used in this 
thesis to implement and test both the proposed reactiv  power procurement and 
dispatch models. The system encompasses a total deman  of 10,940 MW and has 
20 generators, 9 shunt capacitors, and 2 inductors. Bu  4011 is selected as the slack 
bus. The data for generator buses is provided in Table A.1, including the 
generators’ limits, and the demand and voltage level at each of the 20 generator 
buses. The demand at load buses, together with the installed shunt capacitors and 
voltage levels, are given in Table A.2. The data for the transmission lines 
connecting system buses is given in Table A.3. 




Figure A.1 CIGRE 32-bus system. 
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4072 4500 0 -300 2000 500 0 400 1.5 
4071 500 0 -50 300 100 -400 400 0.8 
4011 1000 0 -100 0 0 0 400 1.2 
4012 800 0 -160 0 0 -100 400 1.1 
4021 300 0 -30 0 0 0 400 0.7 
4031 350 0 -40 0 0 0 400 0.7 
4042 700 0 0 0 0 0 400 1 
4041 300 0 -200 0 0 200 400 0.7 
4062 600 0 0 0 0 0 400 0.9 
4063 1200 0 0 0 0 0 400 1.2 
4051 700 0 0 0 0 100 400 1 
4047 1200 0 0 0 0 0 400 1.2 
2032 850 0 -80 200 50 0 220 1.1 
1013 600 0 -50 100 40 0 130 0.9 
1012 800 0 -80 300 100 0 130 1.1 
1014 700 0 -100 0 0 0 130 1 
1022 250 0 -25 280 95 50 130 0.7 
1021 600 0 -160 0 0 0 130 0.9 
1043 200 0 -20 230 100 150 130 0.6 
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4022 0 0 0 400 
4032 0 0 0 400 
4043 0 0 200 400 
4044 0 0 0 400 
4045 0 0 0 400 
4046 0 0 100 400 
4061 0 0 0 400 
2031 100 30 0 220 
1011 200 80 0 130 
1041 600 200 200 130 
1044 800 300 200 130 
1045 700 250 200 130 
42 400 125.67 0 130 
41 540 128.8 0 130 
62 300 80.02 0 130 
63 590 256.19 0 130 
51 800 253.22 0 130 
47 100 45.19 0 130 
43 900 238.83 0 130 
46 700 193.72 0 130 
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Table A.3 Transmission lines. 
Line Resistance (Ω) Reactance (Ω) Charging (p.u.) 
4011.4012 1.6 12.8 0.4 
4011.4021 9.6 96 3.58 
4011.4022 6.4 64 2.39 
4011.4071 8 72 2.79 
4012.4022 6.4 56 2.09 
4012.4071 8 80 2.98 
4021.4032 6.4 64 2.39 
4021.4042 16 96 5.97 
4031.4022 3.2 32 1.2 
4031.4032 1.6 16 0.6 
4031.4041 4.8 32 2.39 
4042.4032 16 64 3.98 
4032.4044 9.6 80 4.77 
4041.4044 4.8 48 1.79 
4041.4061 9.6 72 2.59 
4042.4043 3.2 24 0.99 
4042.4044 3.2 32 1.19 
4043.4044 1.6 16 0.6 
4043.4046 1.6 16 0.6 
4043.4047 3.2 32 1.19 
4044.4045 1.6 16 0.6 
4045.4051 3.2 32 1.2 
4045.4062 17.6 128 4.77 
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page. 
Line Resistance (Ω) Reactance (Ω) Charging (p.u.) 
4046.4047 1.6 24 0.99 
4061.4062 2.4 24 0.9 
4062.4063 2.4 24 0.9 
4071.4072 2.4 24 3 
2031.2032 2.9 21.78 0.05 
1011.1013 0.85 5.9 0.13 
1012.1014 1.2 7.6 0.17 
1013.1014 0.59 4.23 0.1 
1021.1022 2.54 16.9 0.29 
1041.1043 0.85 5.07 0.12 
1041.1045 1.27 10.14 0.24 
1042.1044 3.21 23.66 0.57 
1042.1045 8.45 50.7 1.13 
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